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The emergence of large scale distributed computing networks has given in-
creased prominence to a number of algorithmic concerns, including the need to
handle dynamic membership, selfishness, and incomplete information. In this doc-
ument, we outline our explorations into these algorithmic issues.
We first present our results on the analysis of a graph-based coupon collec-
vi
tor process related to load balancing for networks with dynamic membership. In
addition to extending the study of the coupon collector process, our results imply
load balancing properties of certain distributed hash tables.
Second, we detail our results on worst case payoffs when playing buyer-
supplier games, against many selfish, collaborating opponents. We study optimiza-
tion over the set of core vectors. We show both positive and negative results on
optimizing over the cores of such games. Furthermore, we introduce and study the
concept of focus point price, which answers the question: If we are constrained to
play in equilibrium, how much can we lose by playing the wrong equilibrium?
Finally, we present our analysis of a revenue management problem with in-
complete information, the online weighted transversal matroid matching problem.
In specific, we present an algorithm that delivers expected revenue within a con-
stant of optimal in the online setting. Our results use a novel algorithm to generalize
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The emergence of large scale distributed computing networks has given prominence
to a number of algorithmic concerns. First, algorithms should handle dynamic
membership. In a large scale system, it is undesirable to have preallocated, central,
coordinating nodes for controlling membership. Such nodes limit the scalability of
the network and are bottle necks of communication. Second, algorithms should
handle selfish behavior on behalf of the computational nodes. For example, if the
network is spread across machines owned by several entities, each entity may have
its selfish interests override the interests of the community. Third, the algorithms
should work even when there is a lack of total information. For example, when
running an algorithm based on input from many participants, the algorithm may
not have access to the full input before a decision is required. Instead, the algorithm
would need to make on the spot, near-optimal decisions as input becomes available.
In this document, we present some methods of dealing with the algorithmic
issues of distributed computing networks. First, using probabilistic analysis, we con-
sider a random process with close connections to load balancing in distributed net-
works. We show some desirable properties of the random process that directly lead
to a load balancing scheme in distributed networks with dynamic membership. Sec-
ond, using game theory, we analyze a class of games called buyer-supplier games. We
consider the case where players can selfishly collude in an unrestricted fashion and
derive algorithms for finding worst case payoffs in the selfish environment. Third,
1
we present an algorithm for finding near-optimal matchings in weighted transver-
sal matroids. The algorithm works without full knowledge of the input and finds
applications in search engine auctions, scheduling, and other domains.
The rest of the document is structured as follows. In the rest of this chapter,
we give some context and discussion of the results presented in the document. In
Section 1.2, we briefly describe our results on load balancing in distributed networks.
The full results are then presented in Chapter 2. In Section 1.3, we review some
game theoretic preliminaries and discuss our work on buyer-supplier games. The
full results are then presented in Chapter 3. In Section 1.4, we detail some of the
connections between probabilistic analysis and game theory that lead to our work
on the online matroid problem. We present our full results on the online matroid
problem in Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 5, we provide some concluding remarks
and discussion on future directions.
1.2 Dynamic Membership
In this section, we discuss our results on analyzing graph-based variants of the
classic coupon collector process. To provide context, in Section 1.2.1, we present
some history of the applications and variants of the coupon collector process. Then,
in Section 1.2.2, we discuss our results on several graph-based variants and related
load balancing applications.
1.2.1 Coupon Collector Processes
One of the most commonly discussed stochastic processes in computer science is the
so-called coupon collector process [26, 40]. In the coupon collector process, there are
n distinct coupons in a bag. The process proceeds in rounds, where in each round we
select a uniformly random coupon from the bag and replace it back into the bag. The
coupon collector process has been studied extensively. For example, we know that
Θ(n log n) rounds are required, with high probability, to see each coupon at least
once. We also know that after n rounds, we would have seen each coupon no more
than O(log n/ log log n) times with high probability [25]. The coupon process can
also be described as as placing balls uniformly at random into bins, where each bin
represents a coupon and placing a ball into a bin represents selecting that coupon.
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One application of the coupon collector process is load balancing in dis-
tributed systems. For example, imagine a distributed system with n servers. Fur-
thermore, imagine that jobs arrive into the system and each job is assigned to a
server. We call the number of jobs assigned to a server the server’s load. The
coupon collector results described in the previous paragraph immediately yield the
result that if n jobs are assigned uniformly at random to the n servers, then the max-
imum load in the system is O(log n/ log log n) with high probability. The coupon
collector process also finds applications in hashing, Markov chain mixing, Monte
Carlo methods and other areas [25, 37, 48].
Study of coupon collector processes goes as far back as de Moivre’s work
of 1712 [26]. Since then, numerous properties and variants of coupon collector
processes have been considered. For example, Erdös and Rényi bound the number
of rounds required to draw each of the n coupons at least m times [17]. Their result
is generalized by Kaplan, who bounds the number of rounds required for l of the
n coupons to be seen at least m times [29]. More recently, Azar et al., using the
balls and bins interpretation of the process, and consider a variant where in each
round we choose two bins uniformly at random and place the ball in the least loaded
bin [7]. They show that in this variant, the maximally loaded bin after n rounds
has log log n/ log 2 + O(1) balls with high probability, an exponential decrease in
the maximum load of the original process. Mitzenmacher extensively studies this
multi-choice process variant and its applications to load balancing in his thesis [39].
1.2.2 A Graph-Based Coupon Collector Process
Similar to Mitzenmacher, we also study several variants of the coupon collector
process. The variants we study take place on a graph and find applications in load
balancing for distributed hash tables.
A distributed hash table (DHT), is a special type of distributed network with
a primary focus on data storage. In a DHT, every machine is in charge of a fraction
of the storage namespace; this fraction of the namespace is the machine’s load. A
typical DHT connects n machines so that each machine has Θ(log n) neighbors. One
method for the (n + 1)st machine to join the DHT consists of the following three
steps:
• Select a uniformly random machine from the n machines in the DHT.
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• Query the selected machine’s neighbors for their loads.
• Join the network by splitting the load of the most heavily loaded neighbor.
Adler et al. have shown how to use similarities between the described join procedure
and a graph-based coupon collector process to prove load balance guarantees in the
distributed hash table [1].
Consider the following graph-based coupon collector process. Initially, all
the nodes of the graph are uncovered. The process then proceeds in rounds. In each
round, we first select a uniformly random node and cover one of the selected node’s
uncovered neighbors. Of course, exactly how we choose which uncovered neighbor
to cover leads to different variants of the graph-based coupon collector process. If
we imagine that a DHT is formed by the nodes of the graph, one can relate covering
a node in the process to splitting the load of the node in the DHT. Adler et al.
use this relationship to show that O(n) cover time, where n is the number of nodes
in the graph, in such a graph-based coupon collector process lead to load balance
guarantees in DHTs.
To be more specific, the cover time of a graph-based coupon collector process
is a random variable indicating the round on which the last uncovered node of the
graph is covered. Using the approach of Adler et al., an O(n) cover time be used to
show that, under the described DHT join procedure, if the DHT initially has a single
machine with a load of 1, then after n− 1 machines join the DHT, the load of every
machine is O( 1n) with high probability. Thus, up to a constant factor, no machine
is loaded with more than its fair share of the total DHT load. For the load-balance
guarantees to hold, the O(n) cover time result must hold both in expectation and
with high probability.
Adler et al. have shown that picking a uniformly random uncovered neighbor
when the process takes place on the hypercube leads to an O(n) cover time. The
proofs of O(n) cover time of Adler et al. strongly depend on the structure of the
hypercube, and thus the resulting load balance results apply only to hypercubic
DHTs.
In Chapter 2, we analyze several graph-based coupon collector processes on
arbitrarily structured graphs. For several natural variants, we show that if all nodes
of the graph have degree Θ(log n), regardless of the specific graph structure, then
the cover time of the process is Θ(n) with high probability. We show that the
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same asymptotic bound holds for the expected cover time. See Theorem 2.4.1 and
Lemma 2.5.2 for a precise statement of results. Using the connection between cover
time and load balance due to Ader et al., our cover time results directly imply load
balance guarantees to arbitrarily structured DHTs, as long as the DHT nodes have
Θ(log n) neighbors, as is the case with most common DHTs [35].
To show our cover time results, we use what is known as a delay sequence
argument as our argument scaffold [34]. The earliest instances of the delay sequence
argument in the literature appear in the works of Aleliunas and Upfal on parallel
communication [3, 58]. The delay sequence argument is used to prove that a random
process completes in a certain time bound, say T (n), and works as follows. First,
we identify a set of problem specific combinatorial objects called delay sequences.
Second, we define the notion of an i-active delay sequence, which connects the
combinatorial object to a particular round in the process. Third, we argue that if the
process completes in round j, a j-active delay sequence is created. Finally, we argue
that there is no ω(T (n))-active delay sequence with high probability. These steps
let us conclude that the process completes in time O(T (n)) with high probability.
In addition to showing fast cover time results for several variants of the graph
coupon collector process, in Chapter 2 we also show that an arbitrary method of
choosing which uncovered neighbor to cover does not result in O(n) cover time.
Specifically, we show that under a natural process variant there exists a graph such
that each node in the graph has degree Θ(log n) but the graph-based coupon collector
process has Ω(n
√
log n/ log log n) cover time with high probability. In other words,
we show that the method in which we choose which uncovered neighbor to cover
does matter. See Theorem 2.6.1 for a precise statement of results.
1.3 Selfishness
In this section, we present our results on optimization over the core of buyer-supplier
games. But, before we can introduce the results in detail, in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2,
we present some of the required game theoretic preliminaries. In Section 1.3.1,
we informally introduce the definition of a game. In Section 1.3.2, we informally
introduce the notion of a solution concept for a game by discussing several example
solution concepts. Then, we present our results on optimizing over the core of
buyer-supplier games in Sections 1.3.3 and 1.3.4.
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1.3.1 Game Theoretic Preliminaries
A game is a strategic interaction between a group of players. Every game has a set
of possible outcomes. The particular outcome realized by playing the game depends
on the actions selected by the game’s players. Each player has a utility, also known
as a payoff, associated with each outcome. Each player’s goal is to take actions that
maximize their payoff in the game’s final, realized outcome.
There are two basic ways of specifying games. The first is called the extensive
form, or game tree. Each level of the tree designates a point in time. The game
begins at the root level and continues to the leaves of the tree, where payoffs are
determined. Each node in the tree represents a decision available to the players.
The game described by the tree is sequential in the sense that the strategic options
available at level i in the tree are determined by the decisions made on levels 1
through i− 1.
The second basic way of specifying a game is called the normal form. Con-
trary to extensive form games, which have an intuitive, built-in, sequential nature,
normal form games are single-shot, simultaneous decision games. In other words, in
a normal form game, each player makes a single decision and the combined decisions
of all the players specify the game’s realized outcome.
It is possible to express extensive form games as normal form games. To
transform an extensive form game to a normal form game, we have the single decision
made by each player in the normal form game specify a strategy for all nodes in the
extensive form game tree. Once the simultaneous decisions are made in the normal
form game, there is a unique, fixed path from the root of the game tree to the game’s
outcome; thus, the payoffs are determined.
We restrict our attention to normal form games. Since extensive form games
can be expressed as normal form games, we do not eliminate any games by restricting
our attention to normal form games. More explicitly, a normal form game is defined
as follows. First, the game has a set P of players. Each player in P has an associated
set of actions, called a strategy set, as well as a utility function which determines
the player’s payoff given the actions chosen by all players in the game. Once the
players, the strategy sets, and the utility functions are specified, the normal form















Figure 1.1: A typical normal form game. The players are {Row,Col}. The strategy
set for both Row and Col happens to be the same, namely {C,D}. The utility
functions listed in the matrix specify the payoff to each player, given the vector of
strategies chosen by both players. For example, the payoff to the Row player when
Row chooses C and Column chooses D is −10.
1.3.2 Introduction to Solution Concepts
In game theory, a solution concept predicts the outcome of a game; the predic-
tions made by the solution concept are called equilibria. Different models of game
play lead to different solution concepts. For example, the famous Nash equilibrium
solution concept was developed within the framework alluded to in the previous
section: players make strategic decisions simultaneously, without any inter-player
communication [56, p. 240]. Intuitively, in a Nash equilibrium, each player is self-
ishly selecting the best response, personal payoff maximizing strategy. A set of best
response strategies can be complementary such that no player wishes to unilaterally
change strategy. To illustrate this, in Figure 1.1 fix the Strategy D for the Row
player and the Strategy D for the Col player. Given this fixed set of strategies, it
is to neither player’s advantage to unilaterally change strategy. If we find such a
set of complementary best response strategies, we have found a Nash equilibrium.
Every normal form game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, where a mixed
strategy is a probability distribution over the player’s strategy set.
A stronger solution concept than Nash equilibrium comes from the defini-
tion of a strongly dominated strategy. We say that Strategy 1 strongly dominates
Strategy 2 for some player if, regardless of the actions of the remaining players,
Strategy 1 always gives a higher payoff than Strategy 2. For example, in Figure 1.1,
the Strategy D strongly dominates Strategy C for the Row player. Regardless of
what Col plays, Row always receives a higher payoff from playing D than C. Thus,
C is not a reasonable strategy for Row and we can eliminate C from the possible
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choices for Row. If iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies leads to
a single outcome, we have found a dominant strategy equilibrium. All dominant
strategy equilibria are Nash equilibria, but the converse is not true. Because of the
associated strong requirements, dominant strategy equilibria do not always exist.
As a third and final example of a solution concept, we present the core, which
was developed with the notion that players may collude by communicating before
playing the game, and reallocating payoffs at the end of the game. Intuitively,
if no collusion is allowed, only some strategies are rational, since an individual
player never accepts a payoff that the player can unilaterally and selfishly improve.
Allowing some sets of players to collude further restricts the set of rational strategies.
A group of players does not accept a total payoff that is less than the group can
achieve through collaboration. The core is the set of payoff vectors resulting from
strategies that are rational when we allow every subset of the players to collude.
Again, because of the strong rationality requirements, the core of a game may be
empty.
For a more explicit example of the core, consider a game involving three
players, {A,B, C}. Each subset of the players, if allowed to collude, can unilaterally
guarantee some payoff, regardless of the remaining player’s actions. Suppose that
{A}, {B}, {C}, {AB}, {AC}, {BC}, {ABC} can unilaterally guarantee payoffs of
3, 2, 2, 10, 10, 10, 37, respectively. The core is then the set of payoff vectors where
each subset of players receives at least as much payoff as the subset can guarantee,
and we give out no more payoff than can be earned in the game. In our example, the
payoff vector (10, 10, 17), in alphabetical order of player name, is in the core since
every subset of the players receives at least as much as it can guarantee and we give
out a total of 37, which can be earned in the game. Similarly, the payoff vectors
(12, 15, 10) and (3, 27, 7) are also in the core. However, the payoff vector (10, 10, 16)
is not in the core, since the subset of players {ABC} does not receive as much as it
can guarantee. The payoff vector (3, 28, 7) is also not in the core, because, even if
everyone colludes, the players cannot achieve a total payoff of 38.
1.3.3 Buyer-Supplier Games
The connections between computer science and game theory can be categorized in
two ways.
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1. The transformation of optimization problems studied in computer science into
games. For example, Nisan and Ronen study scheduling under a truthful
mechanism setting [42]. Also, Archer and Tardos devise truthful mechanisms
for several combinatorial problems where the players’ secret information is a
single positive real number [6].
2. Algorithmic investigations into game theoretic concepts. For example, the
work of Daskalakis et al. classifies the computational complexity of Nash
equilibrium [13]. Also, Deng and Papadimitriou study the computability of
the Arrow-Debreu pricing equilibrium [15].
In Chapter 3, we present our results on optimization over the core of a large class of
games called buyer-supplier games. As such, our work fits into both categories. A
buyer-supplier game can be derived from most combinatorial minimization problems,
thus the work fits into the first category. Given a game theoretic characterization
of the core, the study of efficient optimization over the core fits into the second
category.
Buyer-supplier games, a subset of assignment games, have been studied for
decades. Shapley and Shubik originally characterized the core of buyer-supplier
games [55]. Since the work a Shapley and Shubik, there has been a series of works
both in the economics and computer science literature on buyer-supplier games [10,
18, 22].
We introduce buyer-supplier games with a specific example. The buyer-
supplier minimum spanning tree (MST) game is a buyer-supplier game derived from
the MST minimization problem. The set of players for the MST buyer-supplier
game consists of a set of suppliers, one for each edge, and a single buyer player.
Each supplier owns their corresponding edge, and the buyer’s goal is to purchase a
spanning tree from the suppliers. Consequently, a strategy for a supplier is a single
positive real number representing a bid submitted by the supplier to the buyer. A
strategy for the buyer is a subset of the suppliers, representing the set of suppliers
chosen by the buyer for a purchase. To model a real situation accurately, the utility
functions are defined as follows. Each supplier has an internal cost associated with
supplying goods to the buyer. The buyer has a fixed maximum amount of money,
M , they are willing to spend on purchasing services from the suppliers. The payoff
for the buyer is 0 if the edges chosen do not span the graph, and is otherwise equal to
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the remainder of the M dollars, after payments to the chosen suppliers are complete.
The payoff for a supplier is 0 if the supplier is not chosen by the buyer, and equal
to the supplier’s bid otherwise.
The MST buyer-supplier game lends itself to a natural interpretation. A
company owns factories on every node of a graph. The company wishes to connect
the factories by purchasing edges in the graph. Each edge is owned by a unique
supplier player. Each supplier has an internal cost associated with the company’s
usage of the edge. The company has a maximum amount of money it is willing
to spend on purchasing edges. The buyer-supplier game paradigm yields similarly
natural games when applied to other minimization problems. For example, Steiner
tree, shortest path, minimum set cover, minimum cut, facility location, single- and
multi-commodity flow can all be used to instantiate a buyer-supplier game. A
general method of transforming a combinatorial minimization problem to a buyer-
supplier game is presented in Chapter 3.
1.3.4 Optimization Over the Core of Buyer-Supplier Games
We informally introduced the core solution concept in Section 1.3.2. Unlike Nash
equilibrium, which is usually defined by a vector of strategies, the core is usually
defined by a vector of payoffs. Furthermore, the core can be defined under two
distinct settings: the transferable utility (TU) setting, and the non-transferable
utility (NTU) setting. In the TU setting, we expand each player’s strategy set to
include the transfer of any amount of their own utility to other players of the game.
In the NTU setting, such utility transfers are disallowed.
Shapley and Shubik developed the definition of the core and showed that
for buyer-supplier games, the core in the TU setting can be characterized by an
exponentially sized set of linear inequalities on the payoff vector [55]. In Chapter 3,
we show the surprising result that the same characterization holds in the NTU
setting. The proof is based on the intuitive observation that transfers of utility can
be simulated in the NTU setting by an adjustment to the supplier bids.
In our investigations, we introduce the concept of focus point price. Solution
concepts often yield multiple predictions, or equilibria. For example, there may be
multiple vectors in the core. In actual game play, however, only one of the equilibria
can be chosen by the players. Experiments show that conditions outside the game,
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such as societal pressures or undue attention to a specific player, focus the players’
attention on the point of a single equilibrium. A classic example is given by a
boardroom meeting, where a volunteer is needed to perform an undesirable task. In
real situations, everyone stays perfectly still in the hope of that the group’s focus
will not fall on them.
The focus point price measures the value of a good focus point. In other
words, the focus point price is the difference between the best and worst equilibrium
outcome, where the terms best and worst are based on some desirable criterion.
Stated succinctly, the focus point price answers the question: If we are constrained
to play in equilibrium, how much can we lose by playing the wrong equilibrium?
The focus point price concept motivates our examination of optimization
over the core of buyer-supplier games. We concentrate on the focus point price from
the buyer’s perspective. In other words, we try to answer the question: What is
the difference between the best and worst possible core outcome for the buyer? For
the rest of the document, when we say the buyer’s focus point price, we mean this
specific instance of the focus point price concept. In Chapter 3, we give two main
computational results, with applications to general buyer supplier games.
First, we give a positive computational result by exhibiting a separation ora-
cle over the exponential set of equations defining the core. Given a separation oracle,
the ellipsoid algorithm can be used to solve linear optimizations over the exponential
set of equations. The ellipsoid algorithm only calls the separation oracle a polyno-
mial number of times. Thus, if the separation oracle runs in polynomial time, we can
optimize linear functions over the exponential set of equations in polynomial time.
For a combinatorial minimization problem and the corresponding buyer-supplier
game, we are able to show that if it is possible to solve the minimization problem in
polynomial time, then it is possible to optimize linear functions over the core of the
game in polynomial time. See Theorem 3.4.1 for the precise statement of results.
Second, we give a complementary result, which can be used to show hardness
of optimization over the core. For a combinatorial minimization problem and the
corresponding buyer-supplier game, by using several polynomial time reductions, we
can show that solving the minimization problem is polynomial time equivalent to
optimization over the core of the game. See Theorem 3.5.8 for the precise statement
of results. In the process of showing Theorem 3.5.8, we also derive strong negative
results for computing the buyer’s focus point price. We show that if the underlying
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minimization problem is not solvable in polynomial time, then it is not possible
to approximate the buyer’s focus point price to within any multiplicative factor in
polynomial time.
Finally, to complement our general results on optimization over the core of
buyer-supplier games, we also exhibit a simple extension of Kruskal’s algorithm
that can be used to compute the buyer’s focus point price in the buyer-supplier
MST game.
1.4 Incomplete Information
In this section, we present our results on incomplete information settings. To provide
context, before we discuss our results, we explore some of the intimate ties between
probabilistic analysis and game theory that result from modeling incomplete infor-
mation. In Sections 1.4.1, we give an example of how incentives can lead players
not to reveal their private information, leading to incomplete information. In 1.4.2,
we discuss some of the main approaches to dealing with incomplete information in
games, which include modeling a lack of knowledge as a probability distribution
over the possibilities. In Section 1.4.3, we consider the connections between ran-
dom processes and games to further reinforce the connections between game theory
and probabilistic analysis. Finally, in Section 1.4.4, we discuss our work on the
online matroid problem, a problem in a random process setting with incomplete
information.
1.4.1 Private Information Leads to Incomplete Information
The application of any of the solution concepts in Section 1.3.2, and indeed a player’s
decision making process as they try to maximize their payoff, depends on knowing
the utilities of all the players in the game. However, in real applications, it is
typical for each player to know only their own utility function. Each player depends
on outside information to get a sense of the other players’ utilities. Because of this
dependence on outside information, it may be advantageous for players not to reveal
their true evaluation of the game’s outcomes.
To illustrate the benefits of not revealing private information, consider the
“Chicken” game, displayed in Figure 1.2a. In this game, two cars drive directly





























(b) Tough Man Chicken Game
Figure 1.2: The normal form game in 1.2a is the “Chicken” game. In this game
two cars square off and drive directly at each other. Each driver has the choice to
continue driving forward or swerve. The normal form game in 1.2b is the “Tough
Man Chicken” game. In this game Car2 has convinced Car1 that Car2 only cares
about its honor – driving is always preferable to swerving.
both drive forward, they crash and suffer terrible losses. If one swerves but the
other drives, the swerver suffers humiliation and other car declares victory. Finally,
if both cars swerve, both suffer mild humiliation. Applying the Nash equilibrium
solution concept, we find two equilibria at {Swerve, Drive} and {Drive, Swerve}.
Suppose that Car2 manages to convince Car1 that Car2 only cares about its
honor. In other words, Car1 believes that regardless of Car1’s actions, Car2 always
prefers to avoid humiliation and drive forward. This “Tough Man Chicken” game
is illustrated in Figure 1.2b. In this game there is only a single Nash equilibrium,
{Swerve, Drive}. In fact, {Swerve, Drive} also satisfies the stronger notion of a dom-
inant strategy equilibrium. Thus, Car2 ensures victory in the game by convincing
Car1 of its toughness.
Since players often benefit from preserving the secrecy of their true evalua-
tions of the game’s outcomes, to develop a truly applicable game theory, we must
find ways to deal with this “problem of private information.”
1.4.2 Addressing Incomplete Information
In this section, we detail how handling incomplete and private information leads to
the introduction of probabilistic analysis in games. In particular we detail two main
approaches to dealing with private information.
One approach to dealing with private information is through the design of
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truthful mechanisms. We call a game truthful if it is to every player’s advantage to
reveal all private information. A truthful mechanism is a truthful game in which
the equilibrium outcomes have some desired property. For the purposes of this dis-
cussion, we are interested in the truthfulness property, since it removes the problem
of private information.
A simple example of a truthful mechanism is the Vickrey auction, which is
also called a second price sealed bid auction. In this game the players are bidding
to purchase an item. Each player may bid a non-negative amount for the item. The
players simultaneously submit bids to the auctioneer, and the auctioneer assigns
the item to the player with the highest bid. However, the winning player does not
pay their bid, but only the second highest bid submitted to the auctioneer. In the
Vickrey auction, the private information of each player is the maximum amount of
money the player is willing to pay for the item on sale.
Intuitively, the Vickrey auction is truthful because the auction structure
guarantees that each player has no regret from revealing their private valuation of
the item. If a player bids more than their private valuation, the player runs the
risk of winning and paying more than the valuation. On the other hand, if the
player bids less than the private valuation, they do not gain any utility since there
is no decrease in the payment required upon winning. Upon winning, the player
always pays the second highest bid. Thus, when a player bids less than their private
valuation, the player just runs the risk of losing the auction at no gain in utility.
So, it is in each player’s interest to bid exactly their private evaluation of the item
on sale.
There has been a great amount of work in theoretical computer science on
truthful mechanism design, starting with the work by Nisan and Ronen [42]. Feigen-
baum, Papadimitriou, and Shenker have used truthful mechanisms in the context of
multicast transmissions [19]. Tardos and Archer have created a general framework
for designing truthful mechanisms where the private information of each player is a
single positive real number [6].
There is an intuitive problem with truthfulness which makes the method not
applicable in certain situations. We wish to have a player’s private information so
that we can make optimal decisions when playing against that player. However, a
rational player does not reveal private information if it is disadvantageous to do so.
We give two specific examples where this intuitive problem is manifested. First, if
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the players are involved in just two consecutive, identical executions of a truthful
mechanism, in general, it is no longer the case that revealing all private information
is the optimal strategy. If a player reveals private information in the first execution,
then the player may suffer a loss of utility in the second execution. The brittleness
of truthfulness under repetition holds even for the most common truthful mech-
anism, the Vickrey auctions introduced at the beginning of this section [60]. A
second example of the non applicability of truthfulness is related to the difficulty of
enforcing a desirable property known as budget balance. To maintain truthfulness,
many mechanisms make excessively large utility payments to the players. The pay-
ments made by the mechanism are often larger than the total wealth present at the
beginning of the game, implying that the mechanism is not budget balanced. The
constraints imposed by budget balance often irreconcilably conflict with truthful-
ness and the mechanism’s desired property. For example, in general, it is impossible
to design truthful, budget balanced mechanisms that maximize the net utility to all
players [49].
A second approach to dealing with the problem of private information is
the method of types developed by Harsanyi [27]. Informally, the method of types
removes the problem of private information by introducing a mathematically mean-
ingful notion of “beliefs” into the game. In Harsanyi’s model, every player has
beliefs, represented by probability distributions, about the private information of
the other players. With this model, a player can make optimal decisions by pre-
tending to play a random game with complete information, where the game is drawn
from a distribution determined by the player’s beliefs about the private values of
the other players. The key to the application of this method is the ability to deal
with a wide range of games of complete information.
While mathematically elegant, Harsanyi’s method of types does have several
drawbacks. The first, most glaring drawback is that a player may be entirely unsure
of their own beliefs. But, to properly analyze a game using the method of types,
the belief distributions are required. More pessimistic, worst case approaches can
be taken, but even those require at least a range for the unknown data [2].
The second drawback to the method of types is a more technical one. In the
formal statement of the method of types, each player has an associated set of types,
where each type specifies a utility function and a belief probability distribution over
the other players’ types. The belief probability distributions remove the problem of
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private information when it comes to unknown utility functions. However, to apply
the method of types, while each player may not know the types (utilities and beliefs)
of the other players, all players must know each other’s possible types.
A third drawback of the method of types stems from computational con-
siderations. To compute an equilibrium for a game using the method of types, we
compute an equilibrium strategy for each player type instead of simply for each
player. For example, suppose that we have a game between two players. Say Player
1 has two types {t10, t11} and Player 2 has two types {t20, t21}. Suppose that we are
helping Player 1 compute an equilibrium strategy. Since we are working with Player
1, we know the type of Player 1. Let us say that the type of Player 1 is t10. To com-
pute an equilibrium strategy for t10, since we are unsure of the type of Player 2,
we must compute equilibrium strategies for each of t20 and t
2
1. But, the equilibrium
strategies of the types t20 and t
2
1 depend on an equilibrium strategy of the unrealized
type t11. Thus, to compute an equilibrium strategy for t
1
0, we compute one equilib-
rium strategy for each type in the game instead of one equilibrium strategy for each
player. A lack of information results in an explosion in the number of types and an
increase in the computational burden required for finding equilibria.
1.4.3 Random Processes in Games
Harsanyi’s method of types is one instance where we can think of the set of players
as playing a random game. The concept of playing random games is powerful and
has found wide applicability in game theory. Similarly to the method of types, other
models using a mixture of game theory and random processes are typically more
realistic and applicable than the standard game theoretic models. For example, it is
common to model complex games as a Markov chain, where each node of the chain
contains a game. The result of playing the game at a particular node, along with
some randomness, determines a transition to another node in the Markov chain.
Games evolving based on a random process are called stochastic games.
One common application of stochastic games comes in modeling evolution.
A common evolution model involves a fixed game and a player pool. At each step of
the random process, we randomly pair players in the player pool and each pair plays
the game. If a player does poorly over several rounds of random pairings, the player
“dies” and is removed from the pool. On the other hand, players who do well in the
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random pairings get to “reproduce,” creating clones of themselves in the pool. The
idea behind the evolution model is that over time, successful players dominate the
population in the pool.
A second common application of stochastic games comes in modeling mar-
kets. A market model usually involves a set of players playing a market game, as
well as a set of bystanders each of whom is presented with the choice of entering
the market game. In addition to the current strategies of all players, the payoff
each player receives from playing the market game is also dependent on the player’s
past strategy, the number of players playing the game, as well as some randomness
inherent in the game. A key notion in such market models is that of a “shock.”
Every so often, as determined by random events, the market game experiences a
shock which may drastically change the payoffs given to the players.
A third example of the combination of random processes and games comes
from Shapley’s study of stochastic games [54]. Shapley shows that two player, zero
sum stochastic games have a value. In other words, under every complementary
best-response equilibrium, the expected sum of payment exchanges over the course
of the stochastic game is the same. Shapley analyzes the expected payments in the
stochastic game, similarly to our analysis of the expected cover time in the graph-
based coupon collector process. Shapley continues by giving expressions for optimal
strategies in the stochastic game, strategies achieving the game’s value. A natural
extension of his work would be an analysis of the expected deviation from the game’s
value if the players follow optimal strategies. Such an extension would be analogous
to our high probability deviation results for the expected cover time.
1.4.4 The Online Matroid Problem
In Chapter 4, we examine a revenue management problem under a random process
with incomplete information. Suppose we own a store with n items for sale. We know
that m customers will enter the store throughout the day. Whenever a customer
enters, the customer specifies a subset of the items and tells us that he is willing
to pay a certain dollar amount for any one of those items. We must immediately
make a decision on which item to sell to the customer if any. After the transaction,
the customer leaves the store never to be seen again. A natural question to ask is,
even though arbitrary customers may arrive, if we know that a uniformly random
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permutation of customers arrives throughout the day, can we achieve revenue that is
within a constant factor of optimal without a priori knowing the customers’ desired
subsets of items or dollar amounts?
This particular revenue management problem finds applications in online ad-
vertising auctions and scheduling. For example, the problem can be reinterpreted as
selling keywords on a search engine with the customer’s dollar amounts representing
bids for those keywords. Another interpretation may be selling server time slots,
where customers represent jobs asking to be scheduled in certain slots for certain
dollar amounts.
In general, the problem we have described can be abstracted as the online
weighted transversal matroid matching (OWTMM) problem. See Chapter 4 for the
formal definitions. The OWTMM problem is a generalization of the well studied
secretary problem, which arose as a folklore problem in the 1950’s [20, 21]. In the
secretary problem, there is only a single item in the store, and we must choose
the customer to whom we sell the item. Usually, the secretary problem is a rein-
terpretation of having a single position for a secretary and interviewing a random
permutation of candidates.
Motivated by the applications in auctions, mechanism design, and revenue
management, Babaioff et al. introduce the online matroid problem, a generalization
of the OWTMM problem et al. [8]. In the online matroid problem, given the total
number of matroid elements, the goal is to find an independent set with weight within
a constant of the max-weight independent set when a random permutation of the
elements revealed to us, one element at a time [43]. We call an algorithm solving
the online matroid problem a competitive algorithm. As well as studying several
instances of the online matroid problem, Babaioff et al. demonstrate the connections
between the online matroid problem and the design of truthful mechanisms for online
auctions. The work of Babaioff et al. extends the work Kleinberg on such truthful
mechanisms [32].
The instances of the online matroid problem for which competitive algorithms
are known include the secretary problem [36], uniform matroids [32], bounded left-
degree transversal matroids, graphic matroids, and truncated matroids [8]. For
general matroids, the best known algorithm gives an independent set within a factor
of O(log r) of optimal, where r is the rank of the matroid [8].
In Chapter 4, we present a competitive algorithm for the OWTMM problem.
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Our work generalizes all of the previously known competitive algorithm results for
the online matroid problem. For example, as has been mentioned, the secretary
problem is a special case of OWTMM, where there is only one item in the store.
The online matroid problem on uniform matroids is a special case of OWTMM
where every customer bids on every item. Of course, the online matroid problem
on bounded left-degree transversal matroids is a special case of OWTMM where
each customer can only bid on a small, fixed number of items. The graphic matroid
results of Babaoiff et al. depend on a reduction to bounded left-degree transversal
matroids. The results on truncated matroids give a reduction from an algorithm
for matroid M to an algorithm for the truncation of matroid M . Along with our
results on transversal matroids, this reduction gives competitive algorithms on the
truncations of transversal matroids.
All of the competitive algorithms in the literature are ultimately based on
generalization of a sample-and-price algorithm for the secretary problem that works
as follows. We sample the first half of the customers, not selling the item to anyone,
but recording the customer bids. We then sell the item to the first non-sampled
customer, if any, who bids higher than the maximum bid of the sampled customers.
This algorithm sells the item to the customer with the highest bid with probability
at least 1/4, since, with probability at least 1/4, the second highest bidding customer
is sampled and the highest bidding customer is not.
It is difficult to extend this algorithm to the full transversal matroid set-
ting. Indeed, that is one reason why Babaioff et al. consider bounded left-degree
transversal matroids. We discuss some of the difficulties in Chapter 4. We discuss
our novel sample-and-price technique for solving the OWTMM problem. One of the
main difficulties in proving the effectiveness of the technique are the probabilistic
dependencies that arise in the analysis. To address these concerns, the main tech-
nical section of our proof is based on a series of counting arguments that directly





One of the most commonly discussed stochastic processes in computer science is
the so-called coupon collector process [40]. In that process, there are n distinct
coupons and we proceed in rounds, collecting one uniformly random coupon (with
replacement) in each round. Are O(n) rounds sufficient to collect all of the coupons?
Put differently, is picking coupons with replacement as efficient, to within a constant
factor, as picking them without replacement? No, it is a well-known fact that with
high probability the number of rounds required to collect all of the coupons is
Θ(n log n).
This shortcoming has motivated Adler et al. [1] and Alon [4] to study a similar
graph-based covering process. The nodes of the graph nodes represent the coupons
and covering a node represents collecting a coupon. In each round, a uniformly
random node w is selected. If an uncovered neighbor of w exists, choose one such
uncovered neighbor and cover it. We refer to this process as process CC.
Process CC can use a variety of different covering methods to decide which
uncovered neighbor to cover. If our ultimate goal is to minimize cover time, certainly
the most powerful covering method available is an offline method with knowledge of
the entire sequence of node selections and with infinite computing power. We refer
to this powerful cover time minimizing version of process CC as process MIN. To
achieve our O(n) goal, it is natural to consider log n-regular graphs since the work




Another natural version of process CC — in which the covering method chooses a
uniformly random uncovered neighbor, if any — was studied by Adler et al. [1] and
by Alon [4]. We refer to this version of process CC as process UNI. Alon shows that
for logarithmic-degree Ramanujan expander graphs, process UNI completes in O(n)
time, matching the lower bound for process MIN.
Adler et al. show that for the hypercube, which has a weak expansion prop-
erty but is not an expander, process UNI takes O(n) time, also matching the lower
bound for process MIN [1]. They also show that for arbitrary logarithmic-degree
graphs, process UNI completes in O(n log log n) time. Furthermore, Adler et al.
present an application of process UNI to load balancing in a hypercubic distributed
hash table (DHT).
A process that is intuitively similar to process UNI is one where we initially
assign a rank to each node using a uniformly random permutation of the nodes, and
the covering method covers the minimum-rank uncovered neighbor, if any. We refer
to this permutation-based version of process CC as process P-RANK. In this chapter,
we show that process P-RANK completes in O(n) time on arbitrary logarithmic-
degree graphs.
In fact, we analyze a more general and local version of process CC in which
each node initially chooses a uniformly random rank in a suitable range, and the
covering method covers the minimum-rank uncovered neighbor of the selected node.
(We assume that the nodes are numbered from 1 to n, and that ties in rank are
broken in favor of the lower-numbered node.) We refer to this random rank version
of process CC as process R-RANK. We show that the more general and local process
R-RANK completes in O(n) time on arbitrary logarithmic-degree graphs.
2.1.2 Results for General Graphs
Alon shows that process MIN on any d-regular graph has expected cover time at




d ) [4]. Alon also shows that process UNI completes in time
n + (1 + o(1))n ln nd for random nearly d-regular graphs. Alon further shows that
on any (n, d, λ)-expander graph the expected cover time of process UNI is at most
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n + n(λd )
2(lnn + 1). In particular, this implies that on Ramanujan graphs process
UNI completes in (1 + o(1))n time, matching the lower bound for process MIN.
If our goal is to maximize cover time, certainly the most powerful covering
method available is an offline adversary with knowledge of the entire sequence of
node selections and with infinite computing power. We refer to this powerful cover
time maximizing version of process CC as process MAX. Alon notes that the upper
bounds for expanders hold even if after every round an adversary “is allowed to shift
the uncovered nodes to any place he wishes, keeping their number.” In particular,
this shows that on Ramanujan graphs, the cover time for process MAX matches the
cover time for process MIN, up to constant factors. In effect, the covering method
does not matter for this class of graphs.
Another previously studied variant of process CC favors covering the selected
node. In this variant, we check — immediately after selecting a uniformly random
node — if the selected node is uncovered. If it is, we cover it and move to the next
selection. Only otherwise do we consider the neighbors of the selected node. We
refer to the selection-biased variants of processes process UNI, process P-RANK,
and process R-RANK as process UNI′, process P-RANK′, and process R-RANK′,
respecively.
Adler et al. show that for all d-regular graphs, processes UNI and UNI′ finish
in O(n+n(log n)(log d)/d) time[1]. They also show that for random d-regular graphs
only O(n + n log nd ) steps are needed. Furthermore, they exhibit an application of
process UNI′ to load balancing in DHTs.
All of the results matching Alon’s lower bound for process MIN presented
prior to this work have used some expansion properties of the underlying graph.
In contrast, our proof techniques do not require the underlying graph to have any
particular structure. Thus, we show the following general result: for directed graphs,
with self-loops but no parallel edges, where each node has in-degree at least δin and
at most ∆in, and out-degree at most ∆out, both process R-RANK and process
R-RANK′ cover all nodes in O(n max(∆in∆out/δ2in, (log n)/δin)) rounds with high
probability. This result matches Alon’s lower bound for δin = ∆in = ∆out = Θ(d),
and is thus optimal under these conditions.
Furthermore, Alon’s results for Ramanujan graphs raise the question whether
there is any separation between the cover times for process MAX and process MIN.
In other words, are there any graphs for which the choice of covering method mat-
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ters? We define a weakly adversarial process, process A-RANK, that is similar
to process P-RANK. In process A-RANK, instead of picking a uniformly random
permutation, an adversary is initally allowed to fix the permutation used to assign
ranks to the nodes. We then proceed as in process P-RANK. In addition, we define
the selection-biased variant of process A-RANK as process A-RANK′. We establish
that there exists a logarithmic-degree graph on which process A-RANK and process
A-RANK′ each take ω(n) rounds to complete. This implies that in general there
is separation between the cover times of process MIN and process MAX. In other
words, the covering method does matter.
2.1.3 Proof Outline
The proof of our theorem is inspired by the delay sequence argument used by Ranade
for the analysis of a certain packet routing problem on the butterfly [47] (see also [34,
Section 3.4.4]). In a delay sequence argument, we identify certain combinatorial
structures that exist whenever the random process lasts for a long time. Then, we
show that the probability any of these structures exist is small. This in turn implies
an upper bound on the running time of the random process.
There are significant differences between our proof and that of Ranade. For
example, in our problem, the connection between the running time and the length
of a delay sequence is not clear-cut, while in the butterfly routing problem analyzed
by Ranade, the length of the delay sequence is equal to the running time. But let
us begin by giving the notion of a delay sequence in our problem.
Consider the node that was covered last, say w1. Why wasn’t w1 covered
earlier? It was not covered earlier because at the last opportunity to cover w1 —
that is, the last selection in w1’s neighborhood — we covered some other node, w2,
instead. In such a case we consider w1 to be delayed by w2. Similarly, w2 may be
delayed by some node w3, et cetera, until finally we reach a node wk that is not
delayed, i.e., wk is covered at the first opportunity. The sequence of nodes w1, . . . , wk
corresponds to our notion of a delay sequence.
In analyzing process R-RANK, we find it useful to first analyze a much
simpler process, process SELECT, in which we repeatedly select a uniformly random
node, never covering anything. After establishing several lemmas for the simpler
process, we proceed to analyzing process R-RANK. This is the bulk of the proof,
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and includes a technical lemma to work around the difficulties in linking cover time
to delay sequence length. Finally, we reduce process R-RANK′ to process R-RANK
to show that the same bounds hold.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we present
a number of useful definitions and lemmas related to standard probability distribu-
tions. In Section 2.3, we analyze the simple process, process SELECT. In Section 2.4,
we analyze process R-RANK. In Section 2.5, we analyze process R-RANK′. In Sec-
tion 2.6, we show the existence of a log(n)-regular graph on which process A-RANK
and process A-RANK′ each take ω(n) rounds to complete, establishing that the
neighbor selection method does matter. We conclude the paper with Section 2.7,
where we provide different yet equivalent views of the processes discussed here as
well as discuss several remaining open problems.
2.2 Preliminaries
We use the term `-sequence to refer to a sequence of length `. For any `-sequence σ
of elements of a given type, and any element x of the same type, we let σ : x denote
the (` + 1)-sequence obtained by appending element x to σ.
For any nonnegative integer n and probability p, we use the notation X ∼
Bin (n, p) to denote that the random variable X has a binomial distribution with n
trials and success probability p. Similarly, we write X ∼ Geo (p) to indicate that
the random variable X has a geometric distribution with success probability p, and
we write X ∼ NegBin (r, p) to indicate that the random variable X has a negative
binomial distribution with r successes and success probability p.
Lemma 2.2.1. Let p denote an arbitrary probability, let ` denote an arbitrary non-
negative integer, and let X ∼ NegBin (`, p). For any integer j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ `,
let pj denote an arbitrary probability such that pj ≥ p, let Yj ∼ Geo (pj), and let
Y =
∑
1≤j≤` Yj. Then for any nonnegative integer i, Pr(X ≥ i) ≥ Pr(Y ≥ i).
Proof. Note that if pj = p for all j, then the random variables X and Y have the
same distribution. Furthermore, increasing any of the pj ’s can only decrease Y .
Lemma 2.2.2. For any nonnegative integers r and n, and any probability p, we
have Pr(X < r) = Pr(Y > n), where X ∼ Bin (n, p) and Y ∼ NegBin (r, p).
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Proof. The random variables X and Y can be seen as different views of the same
experiment where we successively flip coins with probability of success p. With Y ,
we ask “How many flips are required for r successes?” With X, we ask “How many
successes are in the first n flips?” In this experiment, the event of seeing less than r
successes in the first n flips (X < r) corresponds to the event that we have to wait
more than n flips for the first r successes (Y > n). This gives the result.
Lemma 2.2.3. For any integer r ≥ 2, we have Pr (X ≥ 2E[X]) = Pr (X ≥ 2r/p) ≤
exp(−r/8), where X ∼ NegBin (r, p).





− 1 and let Y ∼ Bin (j, p). By Lemma 2.2.2, we know that
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+ η and the last equality holds because 0 < (η + 1)p2 < 1.
Recall the Chernoff bounds in the form Pr(Y ≤ (1− λ)jp) ≤ exp(−λ2jp/2)
for 0 < λ < 1 (see [5, 28]).
We apply this bound with λ = 12 to get








where η is as previously defined and the last inequality holds because r ≥ 2.
Lemma 2.2.4. Let p be an arbitrary probability and let X be the sum of n indepen-
dent Bernoulli variables X1, . . . , Xn, where Xj has success probability pj ≥ p. Then
Pr (X ≤ np/2) ≤ exp(−np/12).
Proof. The result follows from Chernoff bounds (see, e.g., [5, 28]).
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Lemma 2.2.5. Suppose we repeatedly throw balls independently and uniformly at
random into n bins, and let the random variable X denote the number of throws re-
quired for every bin to receive at least n balls. Then X is O(n2) with high probability,
that is, with failure probability that is an arbitrary inverse polynomial in n.
Proof. The result follows from Lemma 2.2.4.
Lemma 2.2.6. Let j balls be thrown independently and uniformly at random into
n bins. Let X denote the number of bins with at least one ball at the end of the
experiment. Then, Pr (X ≤ min (n/4, j/4)) ≤ exp(−j/2).
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Throughout the remainder of the chapter, we fix an arbitrary directed graph G =
(V,E) where |V | = n > 0. We say that an event holds “with high probability” if the
probability that it fails to occur is upper bounded by an arbitrary inverse polynomial
in n. We let δin, ∆in, and ∆out denote the minimum in-degree, maximum in-degree,
and maximum out-degree of any node, respectively. For ease of exposition, we
assume throughout the chapter that δin > 0. The edge set E is allowed to contain
loops but not parallel edges. For any node v, we define Γin(v) as {w | (w, v) ∈ E}.
For any sequence of edges σ = (u1, v1), . . . , (u`, v`), we define the two sequences of
nodes src(σ) = u1, . . . , u` and dst(σ) = v1, . . . , v`.
In this section, we analyze a simple stochastic process, process SELECT,
defined as follows. Initially, we fix a positive integer r and independently assign
each node in V a uniformly random integer rank between 1 and r. Process SELECT
then proceeds in an infinite number of rounds, indexed from 1. In each round, one
node is selected uniformly at random, with replacement. The following definitions
are central to our analysis of this process.
A node sequence is said to be rank-sorted if the associated sequence of node
ranks is nondecreasing.
For any node sequence σ, we inductively define duration(σ), a nonnegative
integer, and a node sequence select(σ) as follows. If σ is empty, then duration(σ) is
0 and select(σ) is empty. Otherwise, σ is of the form τ : v for some shorter node
sequence τ and node v. Let i denote the the least i such that i > duration(τ) and
the node selected in round i belongs to Γin(v). Let u denote the node selected in
round i. Then we define duration(σ) as i, and select(σ) as select(τ) : u.










ways that ranks can be assigned to the ` distinct nodes
so that the resulting `-sequence is rank-sorted. The result follows since each such
assignment occurs with probability r−`.
Lemma 2.3.2. For any `-sequence of nodes σ = v1, . . . , v` and any nonnegative
integer i, we have






Proof. We proceed by proving that










and dk denotes the in-degree of vk. The desired bound then
follows by Lemma 2.2.1.
We prove the foregoing claim by induction on `. If ` = 0, the claim holds
since duration(σ) =
∑`
k=1 Yk = 0.
For ` > 0, we let τ denote the node sequence v1, . . . , v`−1 and assume induc-
tively that












Pr(duration(τ) = j) ·


























The second equality holds because each selection is independent of previous selec-
tions. The third equality holds because the waiting time to obtain a selection in
Γin(v`) is distributed as Y`.
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Lemma 2.3.3. For any `-sequence of edges σ, Pr(select(dst(σ)) = src(σ)) ≤ δ−`in .
Proof. We proceed by induction on `. For ` = 0, Pr(select(dst(σ)) = src(σ)) = 1 =
δ0in since we have assumed that δin > 0.
For ` > 0, σ can be written in the form τ : (u, v), where we inductively
assume that the claim of the lemma holds for τ . Let A denote the event that the
first node selected in Γin(v) after round duration(dst(τ)) is u. We have
Pr(select(dst(σ)) = src(σ))
= Pr(select(dst(τ)) = src(τ)) · Pr(A | select(dst(τ)) = src(τ))
= Pr(select(dst(τ)) = src(τ)) · Pr(A)
≤ δ−`in .
The second step follows from the independence of the events A and select(dst(τ)) =
src(τ). (These two events are independent since each selection is independent of
previous selections.) The third step follows from the induction hypothesis and the
observation that Pr(A) is equal 1/Γin(v), which is at most 1/δin.
Lemma 2.3.4. For any `-sequence of edges σ and nonnegative integer i, the three
events specified as A = “dst(σ) is rank-sorted”, B = “duration(dst(σ)) = i”, and
C = “select(dst(σ)) = src(σ)” are mutually independent.
Proof. Note that event A depends only on the rank assignments, while events B
and C depend only on the selections. Thus event A is independent of events B and
C. Below we argue that events B and C are independent.
Let σ = (u1, v1), . . . , (u`, v`) and let σj denote the length-j prefix of σ, 0 ≤
j ≤ `. Define a selection to be j-special, 1 ≤ j ≤ `, if it is the first selection after
round duration(σj−1) in Γin(vj). A selection is special if it is j-special for some j.
Note that event B depends only on the timing of the special events; in particular,
B occurs if and only if the `-special selection occurs in round i. Suppose we run
process SELECT, but at each step, instead of revealing the selected node, we reveal
only whether the selection is special. This information is sufficient to determine the
unique i for which B occurs, but does not bias the distribution of select(dst(σ)).
Since event C only depends on select(dst(σ)), it is independent of B.
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Lemma 2.3.5. Let σ be an `-sequence of edges so that the nodes of dst(σ) are




, let i be a nonnegative integer, and let events A,




· Pr(X ≥ i) · (rδin)−`.





r−`. By Lemma 2.3.2, Pr(B) ≤ Pr(X ≥ i).
By Lemma 2.3.3, Pr(C) ≤ δ−`in . The claim then follows by Lemma 2.3.4.
2.4 Process R-RANK
In the section we analyze an augmented version of process SELECT, referred to as
Process R-RANK, in which we maintain a notion of a “covered subset” of the nodes.
Initially, all of the nodes are uncovered. Process R-RANK then proceeds in rounds
in exactly the same manner as process SELECT, except that in any given round,
if one or more outgoing neighbors of the selected node are uncovered, we cover the
uncovered outgoing neighbor with minimum rank. (As indicated in Section 2.1, ties
are broken according to some arbitrary numbering of the nodes.)
Note that process R-RANK simply augments process SELECT by also cover-
ing nodes; rank assignment and selections are performed in exactly the same manner
in the two processes. Thus all of the definitions and lemmas presented in Section 2.3
are applicable to process R-RANK. The following additional definitions are useful
for our analysis of process R-RANK.
The cover time of process R-RANK is defined as the number of rounds re-
quired to cover all of the nodes.
We inductively define the notion of a linked sequence of edges. For ` equal
to 0 or 1, any `-sequence of edges is linked. For ` > 1, an `-sequence of edges of the
form σ : (u, v) : (u′, v′) is linked if the (`− 1)-sequence σ : (u, v) is linked and (u, v′)
belongs to E.
For any node v, we define parent(v) as follows. Let i denote the round
in which node v is covered. If i is the first round in which some node in Γin(v)
is selected, then parent(v) is defined to be nil. Otherwise, parent(v) is the node
covered in the first round prior to round i in which the selected node belongs to
Γin(v).
We inductively define the notion of a chronological sequence of nodes as
follows. Any `-sequence of nodes with ` ≤ 1 is chronological. An `-sequence of
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nodes of the form σ : v : v′ is chronological if σ : v is chronological and node v is
covered before node v′.
We inductively define the notion of an active node sequence as follows. The
empty node sequence is active. A singleton node sequence consisting of the node v
is active if parent(v) = nil. An `-sequence of nodes of the form σ : v : v′ is active if
σ : v is active and parent(v′) = v.
We call an `-sequence of edges σ active if dst(σ) is active and select(dst(σ)) =
src(σ).
We call an `-sequence of edges σ i-active if it is active and either ` = i = 0
or ` > 0, σ is of the form σ : (u, v), and v is the node covered in round i.




Proof. We proceed by induction on `, treating ` = 0 and ` = 1 as the base cases.
For ` = 0, the empty sequence is the only linked 0-sequence, and the claim holds
since n/∆in ≥ 1. (Note that ∆in is at most n since we do not allow parallel edges.)
For ` = 1, the number of linked 1-sequences is at most |E| ≤ n∆out.
Now let ` be greater than 1 and inductively assume that the number of linked
(`− 1)-sequences of edges is at most n∆`−1out ∆
`−2
in . Recall that any linked `-sequence
of edges is of the form σ : (u, v) : (u′, v′) where the (`−1)-sequence of edges σ : (u, v)
is linked and (u, v′) belongs to E. Observe that for any linked (` − 1)-sequence of
edges σ : (u, v), there are at most ∆out nodes v′ such that (u, v′) belongs to E,
and for each such choice of v′, there are at most ∆in nodes u′ such that (u′, v′)
belongs to E. Thus the number of linked `-sequences is at most ∆out∆in times the
number of linked (`−1)-sequences, and the desired bound follows from the induction
hypothesis.
Lemma 2.4.2. Suppose we run two instances of process R-RANK in parallel using
the same random ranks and the same sequence of random selections, but in the
second instance, we allow an arbitrary subset of the covered nodes to be uncovered
after each round. Then the cover time of the first instance is at most the cover time
of the second instance.
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the number of rounds, at all times, the
set of covered nodes in the first instance contains the set of covered nodes in the
second instance. The claim of the lemma follows.
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Lemma 2.4.3. For any rank assignment, the expected cover time of process R-
RANK is O(n2).
Proof. It follows from Lemma 2.2.5 that the cover time is O(n2) with high proba-
bility since in that time each vertex is selected at least n times, implying that all of
its neighbors are covered.
We can then consider a modified version of process R-RANK in which the
infinite sequence of rounds is partitioned into epochs of O(n2) rounds, and where
at the end of each epoch, if the nodes are not all covered, all nodes are uncovered
before proceeding to the next epoch. Since each epoch covers all the nodes with high
probability, the expected cover time of this modified version of process R-RANK is
O(n2). By Lemma 2.4.2, for any rank assignment, the expected cover time of process
R-RANK is O(n2).
Lemma 2.4.4. Assume that v is the node covered in round i and let u be the node
selected in round i. Then there is an i-active edge sequence σ terminating in edge
(u, v) and such that duration(dst(σ)) = i.
Proof. Observe that u belongs to Γin(v). Furthermore, if parent(v) = nil, then the
singleton node sequence v is active with duration(v) = i. Thus the singleton edge
sequence σ = (u, v) is i-active with duration(dst(σ)) = i.
We prove the claim by induction on i. For i = 1, we have parent(v) = nil
and so the claim follows by the observations of the previous paragraph.
For i > 1, if parent(v) = nil, the claim once again follows from the foregoing
observations. Otherwise, parent(v) = v′ where v′ is the node covered in round j with
j < i. Let u′ denote the node selected in round j. Since j < i, we can inductively
assume that there is a j-active edge sequence, call it τ , terminating in edge (u′, v′)
and such that duration(dst(τ)) = j. Since τ is active, the node sequence dst(τ) is
active and select(dst(τ)) = src(τ). Let σ = τ : (u, v). Thus src(σ) = src(τ) : u
and dst(σ) = dst(τ) : v. Since parent(v) = v′ and dst(τ) is an active node sequence
terminating in node v′, dst(σ) is active. Since duration(dst(τ)) = j, select(dst(τ)) =
src(τ), u was selected in round i, and i is the least integer greater that j such that
the node selected in round i belongs to Γin(v), we have duration(dst(σ)) = i and
select(dst(σ)) = src(σ). Since dst(σ) is active and select(dst(σ)) = src(σ), σ is
active. Since σ is active and v is the node covered in round i, σ is i-active. Thus
the edge sequence σ satisfies all of the requirements of the lemma.
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Lemma 2.4.5. Any active node sequence is rank-sorted, chronological, and consists
of distinct nodes.
Proof. Note that any chronological node sequence consists of distinct nodes. Thus,
in what follows, it is sufficient to prove that any active node sequence is rank-sorted
and chronological.
We proceed by induction on the length of the sequence. For the base case,
note that any node sequence of length 0 or 1 is rank-sorted and chronological. For
the induction step, consider an active node sequence σ of the form τ : v : v′.
Since σ is active, τ : v is active and parent(v′) = v. Since τ : v is active, the
induction hypothesis implies that it is also rank-sorted and chronological. Since
parent(v′) = v, rank(v) ≤ rank(v′) and v is covered before v′. Hence σ is rank-
sorted and chronological.
Lemma 2.4.6. For any nonempty active edge sequence σ, if the last edge in σ is
(u, v), then v is the node covered in round duration(dst(σ)) and node u is selected
in the same round.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on the length of the active edge sequence
σ.
If σ consists of a single edge (u, v), then by the definition of an active edge
sequence, the singleton node sequence dst(σ) is active and select(dst(σ)) = src(σ).
Since dst(σ) is active, parent(v) = nil, that is, v is the node covered in the first
round in which a node in Γin(v) is selected, which is round duration(dst(σ)). Since
select(dst(σ)) = src(σ), node u is selected in the same round.
Now assume that σ is an active edge sequence of the form τ : (u, v), where τ
is of the form τ ′ : (u′, v′). Since σ is active, the node sequence dst(σ) is active and
select(dst(σ)) = src(σ). It follows that dst(τ) is active and select(dst(τ)) = src(τ),
that is, τ is also active. Since τ is active and shorter than σ, we can inductively
assume that v′ is the node covered in round duration(dst(τ)) and node u′ is selected
in the same round. Since dst(σ) is active, parent(v) = v′, that is, v is the node
covered in the first round after round duration(dst(τ)) in which a node in Γin(v) is
selected. Applying the definition of duration(dst(σ)), we conclude that v is the node
covered in round duration(dst(σ)). Since select(dst(σ)) = src(σ), node u is selected
in the same round.
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Lemma 2.4.7. If σ is an active sequence of edges, then σ is linked.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of σ. If the length of σ is 0 or 1, then
σ is linked by definition.
Now assume that σ is an edge sequence of the form τ : (u, v), where τ is of
the form τ ′ : (u′, v′) and σ is active. Since σ is active, dst(σ) is active. Since dst(σ)
is active, dst(τ) is also active. Since dst(τ) is active and τ is shorter than σ, we can
inductively assume that τ is linked. Therefore, in order to establish that σ is linked,
it is sufficient to prove that (u′, v) is an edge. Since dst(σ) is active, parent(v) = v′.
Hence, letting i denote the round in which node v is covered, we find that v′ is the
node covered in the first round prior to round i in which the selected node belongs
to Γin(v). By Lemma 2.4.6, v′ is covered in a round in which node u′ is selected.
Thus u′ belongs to Γin(v), that is, (u′, v) is an edge, as required.
Lemma 2.4.8. If an edge sequence σ is i-active, then duration(dst(σ)) = i.
Proof. If σ is empty, then the claim holds since i = 0 and duration(dst(σ)) = 0.
Otherwise, σ is of the form τ : (u, v), and by the definition of an i-active edge
sequence, v is the node covered in round i. By Lemma 2.4.6, v is the node covered
in round duration(dst(σ)), so duration(dst(σ)) = i.
Lemma 2.4.9. For any `-sequence of edges σ, and any nonnegative integer i, the











Proof. If the nodes in dst(σ) are not all distinct, then Pr(σ is i-active) = 0 by
Lemma 2.4.5 and the claimed inequality holds since the right-hand side is nonneg-
ative.
Now assume that dst(σ) consists of distinct nodes, and let events A, B, and
C be as defined in the statement of Lemma 2.3.4. Below we prove that if σ is i-
active, then events A, B, and C all occur. The claimed inequality then follows by
Lemma 2.3.5.
Assume that σ is i-active. Thus event B occurs by Lemma 2.4.8. Further-
more, σ is active, so dst(σ) is active and event C occurs by the definition of an
active edge sequence. Since dst(σ) is active, event A occurs by Lemma 2.4.5.
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Lemma 2.4.10. For any nonnegative integers i and `, the probability that some















Proof. By Lemma 2.4.7, if an edge sequence σ is not linked, then Pr(σ is i-active) =
0. A union bound then implies that the probability some `-sequence of edges is
i-active is at most the number of linked `-sequences of edges multiplied by the max-
imum probability that any particular `-sequence is i-active. The desired inequality
then follows by Lemmas 2.4.1 and 2.4.9.
Lemma 2.4.11. For nonnegative integers i, `, and r satisfying the properties i ≥
















Proof. First, we show that the LHS of the claimed inequality is a nonincreasing
function of r.





r−` is a nonincreasing





















where the last inequality holds since the binomial theorem implies (1 + 1r )
` ≥ 1 + `r .
Since we have established that the LHS of the claimed inequality is a nonin-
creasing function of r, we can assume that r = min(d2e2∆out∆in/δine, `).
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We begin by establishing two useful upper bounds on λ, namely, Equa-
tions (2.2) and (2.4) below.
If r = d2e2∆out∆in/δine, then since since r = min(d2e2∆out∆in/δine, `), we



















Let h(`) denote the natural logarithm of the RHS of Equation (2.3), that is, h(`) =
` ln(2e∆out∆in/(`δin)). Using elementary calculus, it is straightforward to prove
that the derivative of h(`) with respect to ` is positive for ` < 2∆out∆in/δin, is 0
when ` = 2∆out∆in/δin, and is negative for ` > 2∆out∆in/δin. It follows that h(`) ≤
h(2∆out∆in/δin) = 2∆out∆in/δin. Since ln is monotonic, the RHS of Equation (2.3) is
also maximized when ` = 2∆out∆in/δin. Combining this result with Equation (2.2),
we find that for any r
λ ≤ exp(2∆out∆in/δin). (2.4)
(Note that exp(2∆out∆in/δin) ≥ 1 and Equation (2.2) implies λ ≤ 1 when r =
d2e2∆out∆in/δine.)
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We are now ready to proceed with the proof of the lemma. We consider the
two cases ` > diδin/(2n)e and ` ≤ diδin/(2n)e separately.
If ` > diδin/(2n)e, then ` > 2ecmax(∆out∆in/δin, lnn) where c = 16/e > e.
Thus ` > d2e2∆out∆in/δine and so r = d2e2∆out∆in/δine. It follows from Equa-
tion (2.2) that λ ≤ e−` ≤ exp(−iδin/(2n)) ≤ exp(−iδin/(64n)), and hence the claim
holds since Pr(X ≥ i) ≤ 1.















. By the definition of the negative binomial distribution,
Pr(Y ≥ i) = Pr(X +Z ≥ i). And, since Z is nonnegative, Pr(X +Z ≥ i) ≥ Pr(X ≥
i). Thus
Pr(X ≥ i) ≤ Pr(Y ≥ i). (2.5)
Since E[Y ] ≤ i2 and biδin/(2n)c ≥ b32 max(∆out∆in/δin, lnn)c > 2, Lemma 2.2.3







. The claim follows since































(The first step follows from Equations (2.4) and (2.5). For the third step and
fourth steps, note that the assumption i ≥ 64n max(∆out∆in/δ2in, (lnn)/δin) implies
iδin/(32n) ≥ 2∆out∆in/δin and iδin/(64n) ≥ 1/8, respectively.)
Lemma 2.4.12. If r ≥ min(d2e2∆out∆in/δine, n), then every active edge sequence
is, with high probability, O(n max(∆out∆in/δ2in, (log n)/δin))-active.
Proof. Let c denote an arbitrary positive real greater than or equal to 1, and let i
denote the positive integer d64cn max(∆out∆in/δ2in, (lnn)/δin))e.
For any nonnegative integer j, let pj denotes the probability that there is a j-
active edge sequence. Any j-active edge sequence σ is active, so the associated node
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sequence dst(σ) is active. It follows from Lemma 2.4.5 that any j-active sequence
has length at most n. In other words, ` ≤ n for any j-active `-sequence of edges.
Furthermore, if j > 0 then the length of a j-active sequence is nonzero. Since any j-
active `-sequence of edges satisfies ` ≤ n, the condition r = min(d2e2∆out∆in/δine, n)
allows us to apply Lemmas 2.4.10 and 2.4.11. Applying these two lemmas, together
with a union bound, we obtain pj ≤ n2 exp(−jδin/(64n)) for j > i.
Let p denote the probability that there is a j-active edge sequence for some
j ≥ i. By a union bound, p ≤
∑
j≥i pj . Using the upper bound on pj derived in the
preceding paragraph, we find that p is upper bounded by an infinite geometric sum
with initial term n2 exp(−iδin/(64n)) and ratio exp(−δin/(64n)). Thus
p = O((n3/δin) exp(−iδin/(64n)))
= O(n3 exp(−cmax(∆out∆in/δin, log n)))
= O(n3−c).
By setting c to a sufficiently large positive constant, we can drive p below
any desired inverse polynomial threshold. The claim of the lemma follows.
Lemma 2.4.13. If r ≥ min(d2e2∆out∆in/δine, n), then the cover time of process
R-RANK is, with high probability, O(n max(∆out∆in/δ2in, (log n)/δin)). The same
asymptotic bound holds for the expected cover time.
Proof. The high probability claim is immediate from Lemmas 2.4.4 and 2.4.12. The
bound on the expected cover time then follows by Lemma 2.4.3.
Theorem 2.4.1. If both ∆in and ∆out are O(δin), then there is an r in O(δin) such
that the cover time of process R-RANK is O(n + n log nδin ) with high probability. The
same asymptotic bound holds for the expected cover time.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 2.4.13.
The result of Theorem 2.4.1 matches the lower bound proved by Alon for
process MIN and is thus optimal [4].
Note that as r tends to infinity, the behavior of process R-RANK converges




In this section we analyze a biased version of process R-RANK, which we call process
R-RANK′. Process R-RANK′ is similar to process R-RANK, except that immedi-
ately after a selection, if the selected node is uncovered we cover it and move to the
next selection. Otherwise, we proceed as in process R-RANK.
In our analysis, we find it helpful to consider another process, which we call
process H. Process H runs in two phases. For the first phase, consisting of the first
cn max(1, (log n)/δin) rounds, we run process SELECT. At the end of phase 1, we
remove from the graph all edges which did not have at least one end-point selected
during phase 1. After the edge removal, we proceed to phase 2 where we begin to
cover vertices as in process R-RANK.
Lemma 2.5.1. If process H and process R-RANK′ use the same random rank as-
signment, infinite series of selections, and tie-breaking node order, the cover time of
process R-RANK′ is at most the cover time of process H.
Proof. We prove the stronger claim that if process H and process R-RANK′ use
the same random rank assignment, infinite series of selections, and tie-breaking
node order, then at the end of any round i, all nodes covered in process H are also
covered in process R-RANK′.
Call a round i low if i ≤ cn max(1, (log n)/δin), and high otherwise. We call
a node marked if it was selected in some low round.
We proceed by induction on i. For the base case, we consider any low round
i. In these rounds, process H covers no nodes, so there is nothing to prove.
Now, assume i is high. Let u be the node selected in round i in both process
R-RANK′ and process H. If no node is covered in process H, the claim follows from
the induction hypothesis. Now assume node v is covered in process H in round i. If
v is covered in process R-RANK′ in some round prior to round i, there is nothing
to prove. Thus, assume that v is not covered in process R-RANK′ prior to round
i. We now complete the induction step by arguing that v must also be covered in
process R-RANK′ in round i.
If v is marked, then v is covered in process R-RANK′ in a low round since
it was selected in a low round. But, v is not covered in process R-RANK′ prior to
round i, so v is unmarked. Since process H selects u and covers v in round i, (u, v)
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is not removed by process H at the end of phase 1. Thus, u and v cannot both be
unmarked, so u is marked.
It follows that u is not equal to v and u is already covered in process R-
RANK′ as it was selected in a low round. Since u is marked, it has the same set of
outgoing neighbors in both processes, i.e., no edge (u, w) is thrown away in process
H at the end of the first phase.
Let S (resp., T ) be the uncovered outgoing neighbors of u in process R-
RANK′ (resp., process H) at the beginning of round i. By the induction hypothesis,
S is contained in T . Since both processes use the same random ranks and tie-
breaking node order, the neighbor selection procedure gives well defined order of
the nighbors of u. Since S ⊆ T and v is the minimum order node in T and belongs
to S, v is the minimum order node in S. Thus v also is covered in round i in process
R-RANK′.
Lemma 2.5.2. If r ≥ min(d2e2∆out∆in/δine, n), then the cover time of process
R-RANK′ is, with high probability, O(n max(∆out∆in/δ2in, (log n)/δin)). The same
asymptotic bound holds for the expected cover time.
Proof. We run a copy of process R-RANK′ in parallel with a copy of process H,
using the same random ranks, selections, and tie-breaking node order.
We call phase 1 of process H successful if at least δin/4 of every node’s in-
neighbors are selected. If phase 1 is unsuccessful, we over estimate the cover time
of process R-RANK′ by the O(n log n) cover time of coupon collector. If phase 1
is successful, by Lemma 2.5.1 we may overestimate the cover time of process R-
RANK′ with the cover time bound of process H. To find the cover time bound of
process H, we add the number of rounds during phase 1, to the cover time bound
of process R-RANK during phase 2. We apply Lemma 2.4.13 to phase 2 of pro-
cess H where the graph has in-degree at least δin/4, to get a cover time bound of
O(max(∆out∆in/δ2in, (log n)/δin)) for process H. Since the bound on the cover time
of process H is both with high probability and in expectation, if phase 1 is successful
with high probability, the same bound holds for process R-RANK′.
All that remains to be shown is the required result is that phase 1 is successful
with high probability.
Consider a specific node w. The probability of selecting a node in Γin(w) on
any selection is a Bernoulli random variable with success probability at least δin/n.
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The number of selections in Γin(w) during phase 1 is the sum of cn max(1, (log n)δin)
such independent Bernoulli random variables. Thus, by Lemma 2.2.4, the proba-
bility of getting less than (c/2) max(δin, log n) selections in Γin(w) during phase 1
is at most exp((c/12) max(δin, log n)), which is an arbitrary inverse polynomial by
choosing a large enough constant c.
Given that (c/2) max(δin, (log n)) selections during phase 1 select a vertex
in Γin(w), we apply Lemma 2.2.6. To do so, let the variables in the lemma be
n = |Γin(w)| ≥ δin, and j = (c/2) max(δin, (log n)) which is also at least δin if we set
c ≥ 2. Thus, Lemma 2.2.6 tell us that the probability less than δin4 distinct nodes
of Γin(w) are selected during phase 1 of process H is at most exp( c2 max(δin, log n)),
which is an arbitrary inverse polynomial by selecting a large enough constant c.
Taking the union bound over all nodes in the graph shows that phase 1 is successful
with high probability.
2.6 Lower Bounds
In this section, we show lower bound results on the cover times of the processes pro-
cess A-RANK and process A-RANK′ defined in Section 2.1. These results establish
that the method of picking which uncovered neighbor to cover does make a difference
to the resulting expected cover time. While the full proofs of the two theorems are
rather lengthy, the main ideas are straightforward. We summarize these main ideas
in the two proof outlines that follow. The main technical tools employed in the full
proofs are Chernoff bounds and Azuma’s inequality (see, e.g., [40, 5]). Note that
our lower bounds hold even if we restrict attention to the special class of directed
graphs where edge (u, v) is present if and only if edge (v, u) is present; below we
refer to such graphs as undirected.
Theorem 2.6.1. For all n, there is an n-node undirected graph G in which each
node has degree Θ(log n), and an assignment of ranks 1 through n to the nodes of
G, such that process A-RANK has cover time Ω(n
√
(log n)/ log log n) = ω(n).
Proof sketch: Fix n and construct G as follows. First, partition the n nodes into
` levels, numbered from 0 to ` − 1, so that the following conditions hold: level
0 contains n/2 nodes; successive levels have a geometrically decreasing number of
nodes with ratio a =
√
(log n)/ log log n; level `− 1 is the only level with fewer than
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√
n nodes. Thus ` = Θ((log n)/ log log n). Assign ranks 1 through n to the nodes
in such a way that nodes on lower-numbered levels have lower ranks. For each node
u at level i, select Θ(log n) nodes at random from each of levels i and i − 1 (with
replacement), and add an edge from u to each selected node. (If node u is at level
0, then only select nodes from level 0.) We let si denote the number of nodes on
level i and define τi to be ni/ca, where c is a sufficiently large constant. We call a
level crowded if more than half of the nodes on that level are covered.
We inductively show that, with high probability, level i is not crowded until
τi. For the base case, i = 0, the claim is trivially true since τ0 is 0. For induction,
we have two subclaims. First, using the inductive hypothesis we can show that,
with high probability, only a small constant fraction of level i is covered between
rounds 0 and τi−1. Second, we can show that, with high probability, only a small
constant fraction of level i is covered between rounds τi−1 and τi. This completes
the proof of the inductive claim. The theorem results from setting i = ` in the
inductive claim. Specifically, with high probability, level ` is not crowded on round
τ` = Ω(n
√
(log n)/ log log n), which gives the theorem statement. All that remains
to be shown are the two subclaims.
First, we show that, with high probability, only a small constant fraction
of level i is covered between rounds 0 and τi−1. We define a bad set as a set of
nodes from levels i and i − 1 with no uncovered neighbor on level i − 1 on round
τi−1. Inductively assuming that level i− 1 is not crowded until τi−1, we can use the
probabilistic method to show that with high probability no bad set of size greater
than si+1 exists. We over estimate the covers on level i from round 0 to τi−1, by
assuming all selections throughout the specified rounds on level i + 1 or on a bad
set of size si+1 result in covers on level i. Thus, with high probability, the rate of
coverage on level i between rounds 0 to τi−1 is 2si+1/n. The expected number of
nodes covered is then 2τi−1si+1/n = o(si). Using Chernoff bounds, we can show
that, with high probability, only a small constant fraction of level i is covered by
round τi−1.
Second, we show that, with high probability, only a small constant fraction
of level i is covered between rounds τi−1 and τi. We over estimate the covers on
level i from round τi−1 to τi by assuming that all selections on levels i − 1, i, and
i + 1 result in a cover on level i. The rate of coverage is upper bounded by 2si−1/n.
From the definitions of si−1, τi−1 and τi, we find the expected number of nodes
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covered on level i from round τi−1 to τi is a small constant fraction of si. Using
Chernoff bounds, and combining the results from this and the previous paragraph,
we can show that with high probability, level i does not become crowded until τi,
completing the inductive claim.
Theorem 2.6.2. For all n, there is an n-node undirected graph G in which each
node has degree Θ(log n), and an assignment of ranks 1 through n to the nodes of
G, such that process A-RANK′ has cover time Ω(n log log n) = ω(n).
Proof sketch: The proof of this theorem proceeds in much the same was as the
proof for Theorem 2.6.1. Again, partition the n nodes into ` levels, numbered from
0 to `− 1 with level 0 containing about n/2 nodes. However, this time, let the ratio
a of the number of nodes between successive levels be (log n)1/4. We restrict the
number of levels ` to Θ((log n)3/8 log log n). Again, assign ranks 1 through n to the
nodes in such a way that nodes on lower-numbered levels have lower ranks. For each
node u at level i, select Θ(log n) nodes at random from each of levels i and i − 1
(with replacement), and add an edge from u to each selected node. (If node u is at
level 0, then only select nodes from level 0.) Again, we let si denote the number of
nodes on level i.
This time, however, we define τi to be a more conservative nica3/2 , where c is
a sufficiently large constant. Furthermore, we change the meaning of crowded to
denote that more than a 1 − 1/
√
a fraction of the nodes on that level are covered.
The motivation for these changes is that node covers resulting from the bias towards
the selected node quickly cover a significant fraction of the nodes in each level.
Again, we inductively show that, with high probability, level i is not crowded
until τi. For the base case, i = 0, the claim is trivially true since τ0 is 0. For
induction, we have two subclaims. First, using the inductive hypothesis we can
show that, with high probability, only a 1 − 2/
√
a fraction of level i is covered
between rounds 0 and τi−1. Second, we can show that, with high probability, only
a further 1/
√
a fraction of level i is covered between rounds τi−1 and τi. This
completes the proof of the inductive claim. The theorem results from setting i = `
in the inductive claim. Specifically, with high probability, level ` is not crowded on
round τ` = Ω(n log log n), which gives the theorem statement. All that remains to
be shown are the two subclaims.
First, we show that, with high probability, only a 1− 2/
√
a fraction of level
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i is covered between rounds 0 and τi−1. We define a bad set as a set of nodes
from levels i and i − 1 with no uncovered neighbor on level i − 1 on round τi−1.
Inductively assuming that level i − 1 is not crowded until τi−1, we can use the
probabilistic method to show that with high probability no bad set of size greater
than si+1 exists. To show the desired result, we analyse an over-estimate of the
covers on level i from round 0 to τi−1 in to two parts. First, we assume that all
selections throughout the specified rounds on level i + 1 or a bad set of size si+1
result in covers on level i. We show that with high probability, covers of this type
cover no more than a 1/
√
a fraction of level i. Second, using Azuma’s inequality, we
show that the covers due to bias towards the selected node on level i cover no more
than a 1− 3/
√
a fraction of the nodes on level i with high probability.
In the final remaining claim, we show that, with high probability, only an
1/
√
a fraction of level i is covered between rounds τi−1 and τi. We over estimate
the covers on level i from round τi−1 to τi by assuming that all selections on levels
i− 1, i, and i+1 result in a cover on level i. The rate of coverage is upper bounded
by 2si−1/n. From the definitions of si−1, τi−1 and τi, we find the expected number
of nodes covered on level i from round τi−1 to τi is a 1/
√
a fraction of si. Using
Chernoff bounds, and combining the results from this and the previous paragraph,
we can show that with high probability, level i does not become crowded until τi,
completing the inductive claim.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
For completeness, the reader should notice that assigning r a greater value in the
proof of Lemma 2.4.11 does not alter the result. It is this fact that makes the locally
assigned random ranks more general than the random permutation discussed in the
introduction. If we let r = 2n, the random ranks will fix a random permutation
with high probability.
We also note that process UNI is equivalent to a process where each node
selects a uniformly random permutation of the vertices. Then, when a node is
selected, we pick the min-rank neighbor based on the selected node’s ranks – as
opposed to the global ranks in process P-RANK. This once again highlights the
similarities between process P-RANK and process UNI.
Furthermore, we note that process CC on a directed graph can be viewed
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as a process on a family of sets. Let there be s, not necessarily distinct, sets from
a universe of n elements. In each round, we select a set uniformly at random and
cover an uncovered element from that set. When s = n and each of the n sets is the
set of out-neighbors of a particular node from the directed graph, the two processes






In this chapter, we study the core of a large set of games, a subset of assignment
games, which we term buyer-supplier games [10, 55] [56, Chapter 6]. We are pri-
marily concerned with efficient computations over the set of vectors belonging to
the core of buyer-supplier games. Before diving into an overview of buyer-supplier
games, we present some connections between our work and the existing literature.
3.1.1 Related Work
Though suggested by Edgeworth as early as 1881 [16], the notion of the core was for-
malized by Gillies and Shapley [23, 53], extending von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
work on coalitional game theory [59]. Recently, Goemans and Skutella studied the
core of a cost sharing facility location game [24]. In their paper, Goemans and
Skutella are primarily interested in using core vectors as a cost sharing indicator,
to decide how much each customer should pay for opening the facility used by the
customer. Goemans and Skutella show that, in general, the core of the cost sharing
facility location game they study is empty. In contrast, for the buyer-supplier games
we study, the core is always nonempty. Additionally, in our work we do not view
vectors in the core as an indication of cost shares but rather as rational outcomes of
negotiation amongst the players in the buyer-supplier game. Pál and Tardos extend
the work of Goemans and Skutella by developing a mechanism for the cost sharing
facility location game which uses the concept of an approximate core [44].
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There has been great interest in comparing the game’s best outcome to the
best equilibrium outcome, where the term best is based on some objective function.
For example, one may wish to compare the outcome maximizing the net utility for
all players in the game against the best possible Nash equilibrium, with respect to
net utility. Papadimitriou termed one such comparative measure as the price of
anarchy [45]. Roughgarden and Tardos have studied the price of anarchy in the
context of routing [50, 51, 52].
In this chapter, we introduce a quantity with a similar motivation to that of
the price of anarchy. Solution concepts often yield multiple predictions, or equilib-
ria. In actual game play, however, only one of the equilibria can be chosen by the
game’s players. Experiments show that conditions outside the game, such as societal
pressures or undue attention to a specific player, focus the players’ attention on the
point of a single equilibrium, which then becomes the outcome of the game. This is
a common notion in game theory called the focus point. A player may receive differ-
ent payoffs in different equilibria. How much is the player willing to pay for a good
focus point? We define the focus point price with respect to a given player as the
difference between the maximum and minimum equilibrium payoffs to the player.
Stated succinctly, focus point price answers the question: If we are constrained to
play in equilibrium, how much can we lose by playing the wrong equilibrium?
Recently, Garg et al. studied transferable utility games they call coalitional
games on graphs [22]. Coalitional games on graphs are a proper subset of buyer-
supplier games, which can be derived by setting the buyer’s internal cost, Bcost,
to zero (see Section 3.1.3 and Lemma 3.3.21). For some buyer-supplier games, for
example the buyer-supplier facility location game, it does not appear that the game
can be described with Bcost fixed to zero.
Garg et al. study the concepts of “frugality” and “agents are substitutes.”
They show that suppliers are substitutes if and only if the core of the game forms
a lattice. In buyer-supplier games, suppliers are not always substitutes. We show,
in Lemma 3.4.4, that if suppliers are substitutes, we can optimize over the core by
solving a polynomially sized linear program. Garg et al. and, more recently, Karlin
et al. study and characterize the frugality certain auction mechanisms; the focus
point price concept introduced in this chapter is quite different from frugality [31].
A third difference between Garg et al. and this work comes from the fact
that, similarly to the economics literature, Garg et al. are mainly concerned with
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the characterization of the core: When does the core form a lattice? How do core
vectors relate to auctions? We, on the other hand, are mainly concerned with
characterizing optimization over the core. Our main results are in the flavor of Deng
and Papadimitriou, in that we are interested with the complexity of computing using
game theoretic characterizations [15].
Faigle and Kern study optimization over the core for submodular cost par-
tition games [18]. Faigle and Kern exhibit a generic greedy-type algorithm for
optimization of any linear function over the core of partition games whose value
function is both submodular and weakly increasing, a property they define.
The greedy framework of Faigle and Kern captures certain buyer-supplier
games, such as the buyer-supplier minimum spanning tree game. However, even
some buyer-supplier games derived from problems that admit greedy solutions, such
as the buyer-supplier shortest path game, are not amenable to the approach of Faigle
and Kern. In this chapter, we do not restrict ourselves to greedy algorithms. By
making use of the ellipsoid method, we are able to give polynomial time algorithms
for optimization over the core of any buyer-supplier game for which the underlying
minimization problem is solvable in polynomial time.
To provide the reader with a simple, concrete example of optimization over
the core of a buyer-supplier game, towards the end of this chapter, we focus our
attention on the buyer-supplier minimum spanning tree game. We give a simple
greedy algorithm for this problem, which is a minor extension of Kruskal’s minimum
spanning tree algorithm. A greedy algorithm is provided by the work of Faigle and
Kern, but their exposition involves a good deal of machinery. Our exposition is
completely elementary.
Several methods, apart from buyer-supplier games, are known for transform-
ing a combinatorial optimization problem into a game. The cores of these transfor-
mations have also been extensively studied. For example, Deng et al. show results
on core non-emptyness, distinguishability of core vectors, and finding core vectors
for one such transformation [14]. Caprara et al. continue the work of Deng et al.




There has been increased interest from the theoretical computer science community
in game theory. While problem-specific solutions may give us insight, to leverage
the full power of decades of study in both research areas, we must find generic
computational solutions to game theoretic problems. Indeed, others have already
realized this need [6, 46]. In this chapter, we continue this line of work by deriving
generic results for computing with core solutions in a large class of games.
The core of buyer-supplier games in the transferable utility setting is charac-
terized by Shapley and Shubik [55]. As a minor contribution, we extend their result
by showing that the core in the non-transferable utility setting is the same as the
core with transferable utilities. Our primary contributions are as follows:
1. While previous work in the economics literature has concentrated on charac-
terizing the core of buyer-supplier games and relating core vectors to auctions,
our main interest is in optimizing over the set of core vectors [10]. We provide
a generally applicable algorithm, based on the ellipsoid method, for optimizing
over the core. If the original minimization problem is solvable in polynomial
time, we show that it is possible to optimize linear functions of core vectors in
polynomial time.
2. We fully characterize optimization over the core of buyer-supplier games by
using a polynomial time reduction to show that if the original minimization
problem is not solvable in polynomial time, it is impossible, in polynomial
time, to test if an arbitrary vector is in the core of the buyer-supplier game.
3. We introduce the concept of focus point price. Our positive computational
results give a polynomial time algorithm for computing the buyer’s focus point
price in buyer-supplier games when the underlying minimization problem is
solvable in polynomial time. When the underlying minimization problem is
not solvable in polynomial time, we show that it is impossible to approximate
the buyer’s focus point price to within any multiplicative factor.
3.1.3 Overview of Buyer-Supplier Games
The definition of a buyer-supplier game, given in Section 3.2.1, is self-contained and
does not require an argument. However, it is also possible to transform a combina-
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torial minimization problem into a buyer-supplier game. Consider a combinatorial
minimization problem of the following form. We have some finite set of elements C.
We designate some subsets of C as feasible. To capture feasibility, we use a predi-
cate P : 2C → {0, 1}, where the predicate is one on all feasible subsets of C. With
each feasible set A ⊆ C, we associate a non-negative cost f(A). The combinatorial




P (A) = 1
f(A)
where <+ denotes the non-negative real numbers.
To transform the above minimization problem into a buyer-supplier game,
we associate a player with each element of C; we call such players suppliers. We
also add another player whom we call the buyer. In the game, the buyer wishes to
purchase a feasible subset of C. The suppliers, on the other hand, are offering their
membership to the buyer’s set at a price.
To fully specify the game’s model of a realistic interaction, we let M desig-
nate the maximum investment the buyer is willing to spend on a feasible set. We
decompose f such that f(A) = Bcost(A)+
∑
a∈A τ(a), where τ(a) is an internal cost
for supplier a to be present in the buyer’s set and Bcost(A) is an internal cost to the
buyer for purchasing this specific feasible set. In general, many such decompositions
are possible, and they produce different games. However, when specifically applying
the core solution concept, Lemma 3.3.21 shows that all such decompositions are
equivalent. Though it is not necessary, to remove special cases in our statements, it
is convenient to let Bcost(A) = M when A = ∅ or A is not feasible.
Now that we have determined the internal costs for the buyer and the sup-
pliers, we can specify the game. The buyer-supplier game is specified by the tuple
(C, τ, Bcost). The strategy set for the buyer is the power set of C. By playing A ⊆ C,
the buyer chooses to purchase the membership of the suppliers in A. The strategy
set for every supplier a ∈ C is the non-negative real numbers, indicating a bid or
payment required from the buyer for the supplier’s membership.
For any supplier a ∈ C, we let β(a) denote the associated bid. Let A be the
set of suppliers chosen by the buyer. The payoff for the buyer is M − Bcost(A) −
50
∑
a∈A β(a). The payoff for a supplier not in A is 0. The payoff for a supplier a in
A is β(a)− τ(a).
Since we are applying the solution concept of the core, one may think of the
game play as follows. All the players in the game sit down around a negotiating
table. All the players talk amongst themselves until they reach an agreement which
cannot be unilaterally and selfishly improved upon by any subset of the players.
Once such an agreement is reached, game play is concluded. Since no subset of the
players can unilaterally and selfishly improve upon the agreement, rationality binds
the players to follow the agreement.
The fully formal definition of a buyer-supplier game is given in Section 3.2.1.
The transformation process described above can be used to create buyer-supplier
games from most combinatorial minimization problems. For example, minimum
spanning tree, Steiner tree, shortest path, minimum set cover, minimum cut, single-
and multi-commodity flow can all be used to instantiate a buyer-supplier game.
As a concrete example and interpretation of a buyer-supplier game, consider
the buyer-supplier minimum spanning tree game. In this game, a company owns
factories on every node of a graph. The company wishes to connect the factories
by purchasing edges in the graph. Each edge is owned by a unique supplier player.
Each supplier has an internal cost associated with the company’s usage of the edge.
The company has a maximum amount of money it is willing to spend on purchasing
edges. Depending on the transportation conditions of a particular edge, the company
may have some internal cost associated with choosing that particular edge. The
buyer-supplier game paradigm yields similarly natural games when applied to other
minimization problems.
In this chapter we will be concerned with efficient computation over the set
of core vectors. For the rest of the chapter, when we say polynomial time, we mean
time polynomial in the size of the parameter C, which is also polynomial in the
number of players of the buyer-supplier game.
3.1.4 Organization of the Chapter
In Section 3.2 we define buyer-supplier games and the core of a game. In Section 3.3
we characterize the core of buyer-supplier games. In Section 3.4 we give positive
computational results, namely the generic algorithm for optimizing over the set
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of core vectors. In Section 3.5 we give negative computational results by showing
polynomial time equivalence between several related problems. In Section 3.6 we give
the problem-specific combinatorial algorithm for the buyer-supplier game arising
from the minimum spanning tree problem.
3.2 Definitions
In this section, we formally define buyer-supplier games and give the game theoretic
definitions required for our analysis.
3.2.1 Buyer-Supplier Games
Let C be a finite set and M be a non-negative real number. Let τ be a function
from C to <+. Let Bcost be a function from 2C to <+ such that Bcost(∅) = M . The
simplifying condition that Bcost(∅) = M is not required. We explain the condition’s
purpose later in this section. For A ⊆ C, let Eval(τ,Bcost,A) denote Bcost(A) +∑
a∈A τ(a). For A ⊆ C, let MinEval(τ,Bcost,A) denote minB⊆A Eval(τ,Bcost,B).
We will omit the parameters τ and Bcost from the functions Eval(τ,Bcost,A) and
MinEval(τ,Bcost,A) when the value is clear.
Given a tuple (C, τ, Bcost), we proceed to define a buyer-supplier game. As-
sociate a player with each element of C. Call the players in C suppliers. Let there
also be another player, µ, whom we call the buyer. Let P = C ∪ {µ} be the set of
players for the buyer-supplier game.
The strategy for supplier a is a tuple (β(a), pa) with β(a) ∈ <+ and pa :
P → <+. The first element, β(a), represents supplier a’s bid to the buyer, requiring
the buyer to pay β(a) for using the supplier’s services. The second element, pa,
represents the non-negative side payments supplier a chooses to make to the game’s
players. By pa(b) we denote the side payment a makes to player b.
The strategy for the buyer, µ, is a tuple (A, pµ) where A ⊆ C and pµ :
P → <+. The first element, A, represents the suppliers chosen by the buyer for
a purchase. Similarly to a supplier, the second element, pµ, represents the non-
negative side payments the buyer chooses to make to the game’s players.
For each player a ∈ P we denote the player’s strategy set by Sa. For a set of
players A ⊆ P, we denote the set of strategies
⊗
a∈A Sa by SA. We call elements of
SA strategy vectors. We index strategy vectors from SA by the elements of A.
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We now define the utility function for each player. Suppose strategy s ∈ SP
is played. Specifically, suppose that (A, pµ) ∈ Sµ and (β(a), pa) ∈ Sa for each





b∈P pµ(b)]. The utility for a supplier a in A is ua(s) =










Interpreting, the buyer begins with a total of M utility and chooses to make
a purchase from each supplier in A. The buyer gives β(a) to each supplier a ∈
A and loses an extra Bcost(A) from the initial M utility. Each supplier a in A
receives the bid payment from the buyer and loses τ(a) because the supplier must
perform services for the buyer. The distribution of sidepayments completes the
utility functions. The requirement that Bcost(∅) = M lets the strategy ∅ stand as a
“don’t play” strategy for the buyer. To remove the requirement, we could introduce
a specific “don’t play” strategy to the buyer’s strategy set, however this creates a
special case in most of our proofs.
Let the sidepayment game we have defined be denoted SP. Let NOSP denote
the same game with the additional requirement that all sidepayments be fixed to
zero. In other words, in NOSP we restrict the strategy set for each a ∈ P so that
pa is identically zero.
3.2.2 Game Theoretic Definitions
All of the definitions in this section closely follow those of Shubik [56, Chapter 6].
We call a vector in <|P|, indexed by a ∈ P, a payoff vector. We say a payoff
vector π is realized by a strategy vector s ∈ SP if πa = ua(s) for all a ∈ P.
Let π be a payoff vector and s be a strategy vector in SA for A ⊆ P. Let t
be any strategy vector in SP such that the restriction of t to the coordinates in A is
equal to s. If for all t and for all a ∈ A we have πa ≤ ua(t), we say that the players
in A can guarantee themselves payoffs of at least π by playing s.
We use Shubik’s alpha theory to define our characteristic sets [56, pp. 134-
136]. Thus for a set of players A ⊆ P, we define the characteristic set, V (A), to be
the set of all payoff vectors π such that there is a strategy vector s ∈ SA, possibly
dependent on π, with which the players in A can guarantee themselves payoffs of
at least π. In the transferable utility setting, SP, the characteristic sets can be
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replaced with a characteristic function. Given the definitions of the utility functions
in Section 3.2.1, the characteristic function Ṽ (A) for a set of players A is equal to
M −MinEval(τ,Bcost,A− {µ}).
We say that a set A ⊆ P of players are substitutes if Ṽ (P) − Ṽ (P − B) ≥∑
a∈B Ṽ (P)− Ṽ (P − {a}) for all B ⊆ A.
We say that a payoff vector π dominates a payoff vector ν through a set
A ⊆ P if πa > νa for all a ∈ A. In other words, π dominates ν through A when
each player in A does better in π than in ν.
For a set of players A ⊆ P, we define D(A) as the set of all payoff vectors
which are dominated through A by a payoff vector in V (A). Interpreting, the players
in A would never settle for a payoff vector π ∈ D(A) since they can guarantee
themselves higher payoffs than those offered in π.
The core of a game consists of all π ∈ V (P) such that π /∈ D(A) for all
A ⊆ P.
3.3 A Characterization of the Core
The characterization of the core of buyer-supplier games in the transferable utility
setting was done by Shapley and Shubik [55]. In this section, we show the surprising
result that the same characterization holds in the non-transferable utility setting.
In general, it is not the case that the core of the transferable utility and non-
transferable utility versions of a game are the same. For example, the buyer may
be able to use bribes to alter the bidding strategies of some suppliers, and thus
reduce the bids of other suppliers. The following condition characterizes the core
of buyer-supplier games. A payoff vector π is in the core of a buyer-supplier game
defined by (C, τ, Bcost) if and only if it satisfies
πa ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ P,∑
a∈A
πa ≤ MinEval(τ,Bcost, C − A)−MinEval(τ,Bcost, C) ∀A ⊆ C,




We prove the result from first principles. In Section 3.3.1, we give some pre-
liminary lemmas for the games NOSP and SP. In Section 3.3.2, we show that the
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core of SP is the same as the core of NOSP. In Section 3.3.3, we give a characteri-
zation of the core of NOSP.
3.3.1 Preliminary Lemmas on the Core of NOSP and SP
This section contains some preliminary lemmas that are useful in characterizing the
core of NOSP and SP.
For some of our proofs it is convenient to think of SP as a two stage distribu-
tion of wealth, where the strategy s ∈ SP determines the utility transfers. Initially,
the buyer has M utility and all suppliers have zero utility. In the first stage, the
buyer gives β(b) to each supplier b ∈ A and loses an extra Bcost(A) from the initial
M utility. Also in the first stage, each supplier b ∈ A loses τ(b) of utility. In the
second stage, side payments are distributed.
Lemma 3.3.1. Let s ∈ SA∪µ be such that sµ = (A, pµ). If s guarantees the players
in A ∪ µ payoffs of at least π ∈ <|A∪µ|, then there is a t ∈ SA∪µ such that
• All side payments from players in A ∪ µ to players in A ∪ µ are fixed to zero
in t
• tµ = (A, 0)
• t also guarantees payoffs of at least π.
Proof. We show how to sequentially remove the specified side payments while main-
taining the payoff guarantee.
Let a and b be suppliers in A. Let sa = (β(a), pa) and sb = (β(b), pb).
First, consider a supplier to supplier payment. Suppose that pa(b) = λ, that
is, supplier a pays λ to supplier b. Because both a and b are in A, we can achieve
the same utility transfer as the side payment by setting the side payment to zero
and changing β(a) to β(a)− λ and β(b) to β(b) + λ. Thus, we can zero out the side
payment from a to b.
Now, consider a supplier to buyer payment. Suppose that pa(µ) = λ. In other
words supplier a pays λ to the buyer. We can achieve the same utility transfer as
the side payment by setting the side payment to zero and changing β(a) to β(a)−λ.
Thus, we can zero out the side payment from a to µ.
A similar change works for a payment from the buyer to a supplier.
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Lemma 3.3.2. Let strategy vector s ∈ SP realize payoff vector π. If sµ = (A, pµ)
and there exists a ∈ C − A such that πa > 0, then π ∈ D(A ∪ µ) in both SP and
NOSP.
Proof. Since all side payments are zero in NOSP, it is impossible for πa to be greater
than zero. Thus, the statement is trivial for NOSP.
Consider the two stage distribution of wealth interpretation of SP. Since
there exists a ∈ C − A such that πa > 0, in s there is a net flow of side payments
from A∪ µ to C −A in stage two of SP. Instead of following strategy s, the players
in A ∪ µ can set to zero all side payments going from A ∪ µ to C − A. With this
action, at least πa more utility stays in A ∪ µ at the end of stage two. The players
in A ∪ µ can use side payments amongst themselves so that each player gets an
extra πa/(|A|+1) utility at the end of stage two than what the player received from
following strategy s. Moreover, since the players in C − A only have control over
the non-negative side payments flowing from C − A to A ∪ µ, we have shown that
the players in A∪ µ can guarantee themselves payoffs greater than the payoffs that
they received from following s. Thus, π ∈ D(A ∪ µ) in SP.
Lemma 3.3.3. If π is in the core of SP or NOSP, then πa ≥ 0 for all a ∈ P.
Proof. We prove the statement by contradiction. Suppose that πa < 0 for some
player a.
If a is a supplier, a can guarantee at least 0 utility with strategy (τ(a), 0) ∈
Sa. If a is the buyer, a can guarantee 0 utility with strategy (∅, 0). Thus, π ∈ D({a})
in both SP and NOSP. Thus, π is not in the core of either game.
Lemma 3.3.4. Let π be a payoff vector, and let s be a strategy vector in SP . If the
players in P can guarantee themselves payoffs of at least π by playing s, but s does
not realize π, then π is not in the core of either SP or NOSP.
Proof. Let sµ = (A, pµ).
We use a proof by contradiction. Assume π is in the core of either SP or
NOSP. By Lemma 3.3.3, we know that πa ≥ 0 for all a ∈ P. By Lemma 3.3.2, we
know that πa = 0 for all a ∈ C −A.
First, we derive a contradiction with the assumption that π is in the core of
SP.
56
Consider the two stage distribution of wealth interpretation of SP. Since s
guarantees payoffs of at least π but s does not realize π, we know that πa ≤ ua(s)
for all a ∈ P and there is some a ∈ P such that πa < ua(s). Thus by following s, the
total wealth held by A ∪ µ in SP at the end of stage one is greater than
∑
a∈P πa.




a∈A∪µ πa. Let λ be the difference between the total
wealth held by A ∪ µ at the end of stage one and
∑
a∈A∪µ πa.
Instead of following s, the players in A∪ µ can set to zero all side payments
from A∪µ to C−A. The players in A∪µ can use side payments amongst themselves
so that each player gets an extra λ/(|A| + 1) utility at the end of stage two than
what the player received in π. Moreover, since the players in C−A only have control
over the non-negative side payments flowing from C − A to A ∪ µ, we have shown
that the players in A∪ µ can guarantee themselves payoffs greater than the payoffs
that they received in π. Thus, we have constructed a new strategy t ∈ SA∪µ in SP
for the players in A ∪ µ which guarantees payoffs greater than π for each player in
A∪ µ. Thus, π ∈ D(A ∪ µ) in SP. This contradicts the assumption that π is in the
core of SP. Thus, π must be in the core of NOSP.
We now derive a contradiction with the assumption that π is in the core of
NOSP. By Lemma 3.3.1 and the fact that t guarantees payoffs greater than π for
each player in A ∪ µ, we also have π ∈ D(A ∪ µ) in NOSP. This contradicts the
assumption that π is in the core of NOSP.
3.3.2 Core Equivalence between SP and NOSP
In this section, we prove that the core of NOSP is the same as the core of SP. All
the lemmas in this section are used solely to prove the main result of the section,
Theorem 3.3.11.
Lemma 3.3.5. Let π be a payoff vector. If π ∈ D(A) in NOSP, then π ∈ D(A) in
SP.
Proof. The players in A can follow exactly the same strategy in SP as they would
in NOSP to guarantee payoffs greater than the payoffs in π; they simply fix all their
side payments to zero.
Lemma 3.3.6. Let π be a payoff vector. If π ∈ V (P) in SP and π is in the core of
SP, then π ∈ V (P) in NOSP.
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Proof. By Lemma 3.3.4, π is realized by some strategy vector s ∈ SP in SP. Let
sµ = (A, pµ).
Consider the two stage distribution of wealth interpretation of SP. By
Lemma 3.3.2, we have πa = 0 for all a ∈ C − A. Thus, at the end of stage two
of SP, there is no utility in C − A. Thus, the players can achieve the same utility
distribution by setting to zero all side payments except side payments from A ∪ µ
to A∪µ. Thus π is realized by a strategy vector with all zero side payments except
the side payments from A ∪ µ to A ∪ µ.
By Lemma 3.3.1, there is a strategy vector with all side payments fixed to zero
which guarantees payoffs of at least π for all the players in P. Thus π ∈ V (P).
Lemma 3.3.7. If payoff vector π is in the core of SP, then π is in the core of
NOSP.
Proof. The statement follows from Lemma 3.3.6 and the contrapositive of Lemma
3.3.5.
Lemma 3.3.8. Let π be a payoff vector. If π ∈ V (P) in NOSP, then π ∈ V (P) in
SP.
Proof. By the definition of V (P), the players in P can guarantee themselves payoffs
of at least π by playing some strategy s ∈ SP in NOSP. The players in P can follow
exactly the same strategy in SP to guarantee payoffs of at least π.
Lemma 3.3.9. If payoff vector π is in the core of NOSP, then for all A ⊆ P we
have π /∈ D(A) in SP.
Proof. We use a proof by contradiction. Suppose that π ∈ D(A) in SP for some
A ⊆ P. Thus, there is a strategy vector s ∈ SA in SP which guarantees each player
in A a greater payoff than the payoff given in π.
Since π is in the core of NOSP, by Lemma 3.3.3 we know πa ≥ 0 for all
a ∈ A.
We split the proof into two cases. In the first case, suppose that µ /∈ A. It is
impossible for s to guarantee a payoff greater than 0 for any player in A since the
buyer can always play ∅. Thus, we get a contradiction with the assumption that
π ∈ D(A) in SP.
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For the second case, suppose µ ∈ A. Let sµ = (B, pµ). There can not be
some supplier in B but not in A since that supplier can always play the strategy
(λ, 0) where λ > M to give the buyer a negative payoff. Since πµ ≥ 0, the existence
of a supplier in B −A contradicts the assumption that π ∈ D(A) in SP.
Thus, we have B ⊆ A− {µ}.
If there is some supplier a in A but not in B, since πa ≥ 0, we know that s
must guarantee a payoff greater than 0 for a. Let ν be the payoff vector realized
when the players in A follow s and each of the players in P −A follow the strategy
(0, 0). Thus, we have νa > 0 and νb > πb for all b ∈ A. By Lemma 3.3.2, we
have ν ∈ D(B ∪ µ) in SP. Since ν ∈ D(B ∪ µ) in SP, νb > πb for all b ∈ A, and
B ⊆ A− {µ}, we have π ∈ D(B ∪ µ) in SP.
Thus, we have sµ = (B, pµ) and π ∈ D(B ∪ µ) in SP. By Lemma 3.3.1, we
also have π ∈ D(B ∪ µ) in NOSP, which contradicts the fact that π is in the core of
NOSP.
Lemma 3.3.10. If payoff vector π is in the core of NOSP, then π is in the core of
SP.
Proof. The statement follows from Lemmas 3.3.8 and 3.3.9.
Theorem 3.3.11. The core of NOSP is equal to the core of SP.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 3.3.7 and 3.3.10.
3.3.3 The Core of NOSP
In this section, we show a characterization of the core of NOSP with Theorem 3.3.20.
By Theorem 3.3.11, the same characterization is true of the core of SP. Throughout
the section, we refer to Equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3), whose definition comes
from Theorem 3.3.20. The lemmas in this section are solely used to prove the main
result of the section, Theorem 3.3.20. At the end of the section, as a corollary to the
theorem, we show Lemma 3.3.21, stating that the core does not change depending on
the decomposition chosen in the transformation from a combinatorial minimization
problem to a buyer-supplier game.
Lemma 3.3.12. If a payoff vector π is realized by some strategy vector s ∈ SP




Proof. For any a ∈ C let sa = (β(a), pa). Since π is realized by s and all side
payments are zero, we have πa = β(a) − τ(a) for all a ∈ A. We also have that

















Since all side payments are fixed to zero, we have πa = 0 for all a ∈ C − A.
Thus we can write πµ = M − Eval(A)−
∑
a∈C πa.




Proof. Let F ⊆ C be such that Eval(F) = MinEval(C). We first show that any ν
realized by a strategy vector s with sµ = (A, 0) and Eval(A) 6= Eval(F) is not in
the core.
Let λ = (Eval(A) − Eval(F))/(|F| + 1). Since Eval(A) 6= Eval(F) and by
the definition of F , we have λ > 0. Construct a strategy vector t ∈ SF∪µ where
tµ = (F , 0)
ta = (νa + τ(a) + λ, 0) for all a ∈ F .
Since side payments are fixed to zero, the suppliers in C−F have no strategies which
can affect the payoffs of the players in F ∪ µ given that the players in F ∪ µ follow
t. Let u ∈ SP be any strategy vector with projection onto F ∪ µ equal to t.
Straight forward calculations with the game’s utility functions show that
ua(u)− νa = ua(u)− ua(s) = λ for each supplier a ∈ F .
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Consider
uµ(u)− νµ = uµ(u)− uµ(s)
= [M − Bcost(F)−
∑
a∈F
(νa + τ(a) + λ)]





















By the utility functions of NOSP and the definition of A and ν, we have νa = 0 for
all a ∈ C −A. Thus, the bracketed quantity in the above expression is at least zero.
Thus, we have




where the equality comes from the definition of λ.
Thus, we have ν ∈ D(F ∪ µ).
We have shown that any vector in the core is realized by a strategy vector
s with sµ = (A, 0) where Eval(A) = Eval(F). The lemma statement follows from
Lemma 3.3.12 and the definition of F .
Lemma 3.3.14. If payoff vector π is in the core of NOSP, then∑
a∈A
πa ≤ MinEval(C − A)−MinEval(C)
for all A ⊆ C.
Proof. We use a proof by contradiction. Assume π is in the core and
∑
a∈A πa >
MinEval(C − A)−MinEval(C) for some A ⊆ C. We show that π ∈ D(F ∪ µ) where
F ⊆ C −A is such that Eval(F) = MinEval(C − A).
Since π is in the core, by Lemma 3.3.4 it is realized by some strategy vector
s ∈ SP
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Let λ = (
∑
a∈A πa − Eval(F) + MinEval(C))/(|F| + 1). Since
∑
a∈A πa >
MinEval(C − A)−MinEval(C), we have λ > 0. Construct a strategy vector t ∈ SF∪µ
where
tµ = (F , 0)
ta = (πa + τ(a) + λ, 0) for all a ∈ F .
Since side payments are fixed to zero, the suppliers in C−F have no strategies which
can affect the payoffs of the players in F ∪ µ given that the players in F ∪ µ follow
t. Let u ∈ SP be any strategy vector with projection onto F ∪ µ equal to t.
Straight forward calculations with the game’s utility functions show that
ua(u)− πa = ua(u)− ua(s) = λ for each supplier a ∈ F .
Let sµ = (B, 0) and consider
uµ(u)− πµ = uµ(u)− uµ(s)
= [M − Bcost(F)−
∑
a∈F
(πa + τ(a) + λ)]





















By the utility functions of NOSP and the definitions of B and π, we have πa = 0 for




a∈C πa. Thus, we can write























Since F ⊆ C − A, we know that the bracketed quantity in the above expression is
at least zero. Thus, we have








where the equality comes from the definition on λ.
Thus, we have π ∈ D(F ∪ µ), which contradicts the fact that π is in the core
of NOSP.
Lemma 3.3.15. Payoff vectors in the core of NOSP satisfy Equations (3.1), (3.2),
and (3.3).
Proof. The statement follows from Lemmas 3.3.3, 3.3.14, and 3.3.13.
Lemma 3.3.16. If payoff vector π satisfies Equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) then
π /∈ D(A) for A ⊆ P such that µ /∈ A.
Proof. We use a proof by contradiction. Suppose π ∈ D(A). In other words, the
players in A can guarantee payoffs greater than the payoffs given in π. But, we know
that πa ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A and the players in A can only guarantee 0 payoffs because
the buyer can always play (∅, 0). Thus, we have a contradiction with π ∈ D(A).
Lemma 3.3.17. If payoff vector π satisfies Equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) then
π /∈ D(A) for A ⊆ P such that µ ∈ A.
Proof. We use a proof by contradiction. Suppose π ∈ D(A) for A ⊆ P such that
µ ∈ A. Thus, the players in A can follow a strategy s ∈ SA that guarantees payoffs
greater than the payoffs they are given in π.
Let t ∈ SP be any strategy vector with projection onto A equal to s. Let
tµ = (B, 0). Let the payoff vector realized by t be ν.
Since s guarantees payoffs greater than π for the players in A, all extentions
of s to a strategy vector in SP must realize payoff vectors π′ with π′a > πa ≥ 0
for a ∈ A. The existance of some a ∈ B − A contradicts this statement, since
the supplier a sets their bid arbitrarily high in some extensions of s, resulting in a
negative utility for the buyer. Thus, we have that there is no such a and B ⊆ A.
Since π satisfies Equation (3.3) we have πµ = M − MinEval(C) −
∑
a∈C πa.
By Lemma 3.3.12, we have νµ = M − Eval(B)−
∑
a∈C νa.
Since following s guarantees a payoff greater than the payoff given in π for
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every player in A, we have πµ < νµ. Thus, we have
0 < νµ − πµ
= M − Eval(B)−
∑
a∈C











Let F ⊆ C be such that Eval(F) = MinEval(C). From Equation (3.2) with the
singleton sets, we have that πa = 0 for all a /∈ F . From the definition of ν, we have
that νa = 0 for all a /∈ B. Let U = A− {µ}. Thus, we have




















By the definition of ν and the utility functions in NOSP, we have that νa = 0 for
all a ∈ C − B. We also have νa > πa ≥ 0 for all a ∈ B. Thus, we can drop the last
term in the above expression to get










By the definitions of ν and U , we also have that νa > πa for all a ∈ U . Thus, we
can drop the parenthesized term in the above expression to get








Let K = F −U . Since B ⊆ A and B ⊆ C, we have B ⊆ U . Thus, we have B ⊆ C−K.
By the definition of MinEval, we have MinEval(C − K) ≤ Eval(B). Thus, we have




This statement contradicts the fact that π satisfies Equation (3.2) for K.
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Lemma 3.3.18. If payoff vector π satisfies Equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3), then
π ∈ V (P) in NOSP.
Proof. Let F ⊆ C be such that Eval(F) = MinEval(C). Define s ∈ SP such that
sµ = (F , 0)
sa = (πa + τ(a), 0) for all a ∈ F
sa = (0, 0) for all a ∈ C − F
Straight forward calculations with the game’s utility functions show that ua(s) = πa
for each supplier a ∈ F .
Consider












Since π satisfies Equation (3.2), we have πa = 0 for all a ∈ C − F . Thus, we have









where the second equality comes from the definition of F and the last equality comes
from the fact that π satisfies Equation (3.3).
Finally, we have ua(s) = πa for each supplier a ∈ C − F , since πa = 0 for
such a.
Thus, s realizes π and π ∈ V (P).
Lemma 3.3.19. If payoff vector π satisfies Equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) then
π is in the core of NOSP.
Proof. The statement follows from Lemmas 3.3.16, 3.3.17, and 3.3.18.
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In the following theorem, the parameter τ is made explicit, though its value
is clear from the definition of the buyer-supplier game, NOSP.
Theorem 3.3.20. A payoff vector π is in the core of NOSP if and only if it satisfies
πa ≥ 0 for all a ∈ P (3.1)∑
a∈A
πa ≤ MinEval(τ, C − A)−MinEval(τ, C) for all A ⊆ C (3.2)




Proof. The statement follows from Lemmas 3.3.15 and 3.3.19.
Lemma 3.3.21. Let Bcost∗(A) =
∑
a∈A τ(a) + Bcost(A). The core of the buyer-
supplier games defined by (C, τ, Bcost) and (C, 0,Bcost∗) is the same.
Proof. We have Eval(τ,Bcost,B) = Eval(0,Bcost∗,B) for all B ⊆ C by the definition
of Eval and Bcost∗. Thus, we have MinEval(τ,Bcost,A) = MinEval(0,Bcost∗,A)
for all A ⊆ C. The result follows from Theorem 3.3.20.
3.4 Polynomial Time Optimization Over the Core Vec-
tors
We define the separation problem on a set of linear inequalities A as follows. Given
a vector π, if π satisfies all of the inequalities in A, then do nothing; otherwise,
output a violated inequality a ∈ A. It is well known that the separation problem
is polynomial time equivalent to linear function optimization over the same set of
inequalities [41, p. 161].
Let (C, τ, Bcost) define a buyer-supplier game. In this section, to simplify
the notation, we will omit the parameter Bcost from Eval and MinEval since it is
fixed by the buyer-supplier game.
In this section, we will analyze an algorithm to solve the separation problem
for the exponentially sized set of inequalities given in Equations (3.1), (3.2), and
(3.3). We now give the algorithm, which we call the separation algorithm. Given
the payoff vector π as input,
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1 Iterate over Equations (3.1) and (3.3) to check that they hold. If some equation
does not hold, output that equation and halt.
2 Compute F ⊆ C such that Eval(τ,F) = MinEval(τ, C). If there is some a ∈
C − F with πa > 0, output the inequality from Equation (3.2) corresponding
to {a} and halt.
3 Define τ̂(a) = τ(a)+πa for a ∈ C. Now, compute F̂ ⊆ C such that Eval(τ̂ , F̂) =
MinEval(τ̂ , C). If Eval(τ̂ , F̂) < Eval(τ̂ ,F), output the inequality from Equa-
tion (3.2) corresponding to F − F̂ . Otherwise, halt.
Theorem 3.4.1. If given an input τ̂ : C → <+ it is possible to compute both
Eval(τ̂ ,A), for any A ⊆ C, and F ⊆ C such that Eval(τ̂ ,F) = MinEval(τ̂ , C) in
polynomial time, then the separation problem for Equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3)
is solvable in polynomial time. By the equivalence of separation and optimization,
optimizing any linear function of π over Equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) is also
possible in polynomial time.
Proof. It is clear that given the theorem’s assumptions, the separation algorithm
runs in polynomial time. The statement follows from Lemmas 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.
Lemma 3.4.2. If the separation algorithm returns an inequality on input π, then
π violates the returned inequality.
Proof. If the algorithm returns an inequality in step 1, then the inequality is violated
since the algorithm performed a direct check.
If the algorithm returns an inequality in step 2, then the inequality is violated
since πa > 0, but MinEval(τ, C − {a}) = MinEval(τ, C) = Eval(τ,F).
Suppose the algorithm returns an inequality in step 3. Thus, Eval(τ̂ , F̂) <
Eval(τ̂ ,F). Applying the definitions of Eval and τ̂ , we have
∑
a∈F̂ πa +Eval(τ, F̂) <∑
a∈F πa + Eval(τ,F).
Since the algorithm reaches step 3, we know that πa = 0 for all a ∈ C − F .
Thus, we have
∑
a∈F̂∩F πa +Eval(τ, F̂) <
∑
a∈F πa +Eval(τ,F), which in turn gives
Eval(τ, F̂)− Eval(τ,F) <
∑
a∈F−F̂ πa.
Let A = F − F̂ . From the algorithm, we know that the set F satisfies
Eval(τ,F) = MinEval(τ, C). Since F̂ ⊆ C − A, the definition of MinEval im-
plies that MinEval(τ, C − A) ≤ Eval(τ, F̂). Thus, we have MinEval(τ, C − A) −
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MinEval(τ, C) ≤ Eval(τ, F̂)− Eval(τ,F) <
∑
a∈A πa, which shows that the inequal-
ity output by the algorithm is violated.
Lemma 3.4.3. If π violates some inequality in Equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3),
then the separation algorithm run on input π returns an inequality.
Proof. If the violation is in Equations (3.1) or (3.3), the violated inequality will be
output by the direct check in step 1. If some inequality is output by step 2, we are
done. Otherwise, since steps 1 and 2 output no inequality, we know that πa = 0 for
all a ∈ C − F , where F is as computed in the algorithm.
Now, suppose the inequality from Equation (3.2) for set A ⊆ C is violated.
In other words, we have,
∑
a∈A πa > MinEval(τ, C − A) −MinEval(τ, C). Let B be
such that Eval(τ,B) = MinEval(τ, C − A).
Thus, we have
∑
a∈A πa > MinEval(τ, C − A)−MinEval(τ, C) = Eval(τ,B)−
Eval(τ,F).
Since πa = 0 for all a ∈ C−F , we have Eval(τ,F)+
∑
a∈F∩A πa > Eval(τ,B).
Adding
∑
a∈F−A πa to both sides of the above inequality and substituting








Since πa = 0 for all a ∈ C − F and B ⊆ C − A, we can alter the right hand










By applying the definition of τ̂ and Eval, we have Eval(τ̂ ,F) > Eval(τ̂ ,B) +∑
a∈F−A−B πa. We know that πa ≥ 0 for all a ∈ P since the algorithm does
not output anything in step 1. Thus, Eval(τ̂ ,F) > Eval(τ̂ ,B) ≥ MinEval(τ̂ , C) =
Eval(τ̂ , F̂), where F̂ is as computed in the algorithm. So, step 3 outputs an inequal-
ity.
The following lemma illustrates a key difference between Garg et al. and this
work.
Lemma 3.4.4. If suppliers are substitutes, then all but the |C| singleton equations of
Equation (3.2) are not constraining. Thus, if suppliers are substitutes, optimization
over the core of the buyer-supplier game is reduced to solving a polynomially sized
linear program.
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Proof. Suppose that the suppliers are substitutes. By the definition of suppliers are
substitutes, we have that Ṽ (P) − Ṽ (P −A) ≥
∑
a∈A[Ṽ (P) − Ṽ (P − {a})] for all
A ⊆ C. By the definition of Ṽ , we have




[MinEval(τ,Bcost, C − {a})−MinEval(τ,Bcost, C)]
for all A ⊆ C. This implies that if the singleton equations in Equation (3.2) are
satisfied, then so are all equations in Equation (3.2). Thus, if suppliers are substi-
tutes, we may drop all non-singleton equations from Equation (3.2) and reduce the
number of inequalities to a polynomial in the number of players.
3.5 Inapproximability of Optimization Over Core Solu-
tions
Consider a buyer-supplier game defined by (C, τ, Bcost). We introduced the concept
of the focus point price in the introduction. The concept leads us to ask the natural
question: What is the difference between the best and worst core outcome for the
buyer? In other words, the value of interest is the solution to the linear program:
maximize
∑
a∈C πa subject to Equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3). This natural ques-
tion leads us to define the focus point price (FFP) problem as follows: on input
(C, τ, Bcost), output the optimal value of the afore mentioned linear program.
Define the Necessary Element (NEL) problem as follows. Given parameters
(C, τ, Bcost) return TRUE if there exist an element a ∈ C such that for all F ⊆ C
satisfying Eval(τ,Bcost,F) = MinEval(τ,Bcost, C) we have a ∈ F . Otherwise,
return FALSE.
Define the OPT-SET problem as follows. Given parameters (C, τ, Bcost),
return F such that Eval(τ,Bcost,F) = MinEval(τ,Bcost, C).
In this section, we will show that the FPP problem, the OPT-SET problem
and the NEL problem are polynomial time equivalent. In Section 3.5.1, we show how
to solve the OPT-SET problem in polynomial time if the NEL problem is solvable
in polynomial time. In Section 3.5.2, we show the polynomial time equivalence of
NEL, OPT-SET, and separation over Equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3).
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3.5.1 Polynomial Time Reduction from OPT-SET to NEL
In this section, we show that given a polynomial time algorithm to solve the NEL
problem, we can solve the OPT-SET problem in polynomial time. All of the lemmas
in this section are used solely to prove the section’s main result, Lemma 3.5.5.
For a fixed tuple (C, τ, Bcost) we say we extend the tuple to contain a shadow
element for an element a ⊆ C by creating the extended tuple (Ĉ, τ̂ , Bcost∗), where
Ĉ = C ∪ b with b /∈ C; τ̂ is the same as τ with the addition that τ̂(b) = τ(a);
and for A ⊆ Ĉ, if b /∈ A, then Bcost∗(A) = Bcost(A), otherwise Bcost∗(A) =
Bcost((A− {b}) ∪ {a}). We call b the shadow element corresponding to a.
The full shadow extension of (C, τ, Bcost) is the tuple (Ĉ, τ̂ , Bcost∗) resulting
from extending (C, τ, Bcost) to contain a shadow element for each element in C.
First, we reduce OPT-SET to NEL. To show the result, we analyze the
following algorithm, which we call the shadow algorithm.
On input (C, τ, Bcost),
1 Let (Ĉ∗, τ̂ , Bcost∗) be the full shadow extension of (C, τ, Bcost). Let the pro-
gram variable Ĉ equal Ĉ∗.
2 For each a ∈ C
• Remove a’s corresponding shadow element from Ĉ.
• Run NEL on (Ĉ, τ̂ , Bcost∗).
• If the return value is TRUE, then add the shadow element back to Ĉ.
• If the return value is FALSE, then remove a from Ĉ.
3 Return Ĉ ∩ C. In other words, we return all elements from C remaining in Ĉ,
disregarding any shadow elements.
Lemma 3.5.1. Let (C, τ, Bcost) be the input to the shadow algorithm. Let the triple
(Ĉ∗, τ̂ , Bcost∗) be the full shadow extension of (C, τ, Bcost). If for all A ⊆ Ĉ∗ the
NEL problem on input (A, τ̂ , Bcost∗) is solvable in polynomial time, then the shadow
algorithm runs in polynomial time.
Proof. Creating Ĉ∗ takes polynomial time since there are O(|C|) elements. Defin-
ing τ̂ takes polynomial time since there are O(|C|) inputs. Queries to Bcost∗ can
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be implemented with polynomial overhead on top of queries to Bcost. Thus, the
initialization step of the algorithm takes polynomial time.
Consider a single loop iteration. The first, third and forth lines of the loop
each take O(|C|) time. The second step takes polynomial time by the lemma as-
sumption. Thus, a single loop iteration takes polynomial time.
There are |C| loop iterations and computing the intersection in the algo-
rithm’s final step takes O(|C|) time. Thus the algorithm runs in polynomial time.
Lemma 3.5.2. The shadow algorithm maintains the invariant
MinEval(τ,Bcost, C) = MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉ).
Proof. Initially, MinEval(τ,Bcost, C) = MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉ) by the definitions of
Ĉ, τ̂ , and Bcost∗.
Consider the loop iteration for a ∈ C. Let the corresponding shadow el-
ement be b. When we remove or add b to Ĉ, we have MinEval(τ,Bcost, C) =
MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉ) by the definitions of τ̂ , and Bcost∗ and the fact that a is
still in Ĉ.
We only remove both a and b if NEL returned FALSE before the removal
of a. Let Ĉa and Ĉ′a be the value of the variable Ĉ before and after the removal
of a, respectively. Since NEL returned FALSE on (Ĉa, τ̂ , Bcost∗), there exists some
F ⊆ Ĉa such that a /∈ F and Eval(τ̂ , Bcost∗,F) = MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉa). Thus,
F ⊆ Ĉ′a and MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉa) = MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉ′a).
Thus, throughout the algorithm the value of MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉ) does not
change, which concludes the proof.
Lemma 3.5.3. Let Ĉa be the value of the variable Ĉ at the end of iteration cor-
responding to a ∈ C. If a ∈ Ĉa, then a is in all OPT-SET solutions on input
(A, τ̂ , Bcost∗) where A = Ĉa ∩ C.
Proof. Let the arguments of the NEL problem which is solved during the iteration
corresponding to a be (B, τ̂ , Bcost∗).
Since a ∈ Ĉa, NEL returns TRUE during the iteration corresponding to a.
Suppose there is a solution F ⊆ C to OPT-SET on input (A, τ̂ , Bcost∗)
which does not contain a. Consider F and F̂ where F̂ contains all the shadow
elements of the elements of F . The sets F and F̂ are disjoint and both subsets of B.
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Also, by the definition of F , τ̂ and Bcost∗, Eval(τ̂ , Bcost∗,F) = Eval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, F̂) =
MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗,B). Thus, the NEL problem run during the iteration correspond-
ing to a should return FALSE, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 3.5.4. Let Ĉa be the value of the variable Ĉ at the end of iteration corre-
sponding to a ∈ C. We have MinEval(τ,Bcost, C) = MinEval(τ,Bcost, Ĉa ∩ C).
Proof. Let F be such that Eval(τ̂ , Bcost∗,F) = MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉa). If we have
Eval(τ̂ , Bcost∗,F) = M , then let F̂ = ∅; otherwise, let F̂ be F with each shadow
element replaced by the corresponding element in C. By the definitions of τ̂ and
Bcost∗, we have Eval(τ̂ , Bcost∗,F) = Eval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, F̂). But, by the construction
of F̂ , we have F̂ ⊆ Ĉa ∩ C.
Thus,
MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉa) = Eval(τ̂ , Bcost∗,F)
= Eval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, F̂) ≥ MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉa ∩ C).
Also, by the definition of MinEval, we have that MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉa) is at most
MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉa ∩ C). So, we have
MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉa) = MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉa ∩ C).
Combining Lemma 3.5.2 with the result from the last paragraph, we have
MinEval(τ,Bcost, C) = MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉa) = MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉa ∩ C).
And, by the definition of τ̂ and Bcost∗, we have MinEval(τ̂ , Bcost∗, Ĉa ∩ C) equals
MinEval(τ,Bcost, Ĉa ∩ C).
Lemma 3.5.5. Let (C, τ, Bcost) be the input to the shadow algorithm. Let the triple
(Ĉ∗, τ̂ , Bcost∗) be the full shadow extension of (C, τ, Bcost). If for all A ⊆ Ĉ∗ the NEL
problem on input (A, τ̂ , Bcost∗) is solvable in polynomial time, then the OPT-SET
problem on input (C, τ, Bcost) is solvable in polynomial time.
Proof. By Lemma 3.5.1, the shadow algorithm runs in polynomial time.
Let Ĉ′ be the value of the variable Ĉ at the end of the algorithm. By
Lemma 3.5.4, Ĉ′ ∩ C is a superset of a solution to the OPT-SET problem. By
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Lemma 3.5.3, Ĉ′ ∩C is a subset of a solution to the OPT-SET problem. Thus, value
returned by the shadow algorithm, Ĉ′ ∩ C, is a solution to the OPT-SET problem.
3.5.2 Polynomial Time Equivalence of NEL, OPT-SET, and Sepa-
ration
In this section we show a polynomial time equivalence between the NEL problem,
the OPT-SET problem and the separation problem over Equations (3.1), (3.2), and
(3.3). The lemmas in this section are used to show the section’s main result, Theo-
rem 3.5.8. As a byproduct of the proofs, we also show an hardness of approximation
result for the FPP problem with Lemma 3.5.9.
Lemma 3.5.6. The solution to the FPP problem on input (C, τ, Bcost) is 0 if and
only if the solution to the NEL problem on input (C, τ, Bcost) is FALSE.
Proof. First, we prove that if the solution to the NEL problem is FALSE, then
the solution to the FPP problem is zero. Consider all of the inequality pairs
πa ≤ MinEval(τ,Bcost, C − {a}) − MinEval(τ,Bcost, C) and πa ≥ 0. Since the so-
lution to the NEL problem is FALSE, for each a ∈ C there is a Fa ⊆ C such that
Eval(Fa,Bcost, C) = MinEval(τ,Bcost, C) and a /∈ Fa. Thus the first inequality in
the pair reduces to πa ≤ 0, and the pair of inequalities imply πa = 0. This is true
for all a ∈ C. Thus, optimal value of the FPP linear program is zero.
Second, we prove that if the solution to the NEL problem is TRUE, then the
solution to the FPP problem is greater than zero. If the solution to NEL is TRUE,
then there is some a ∈ C such that if Eval(τ,Bcost,F) = MinEval(τ,Bcost, C) then
a ∈ F . In other words, a is in all solutions to the OPT-SET problem on input
(C, τ, Bcost).
Thus, for all A ⊆ C with a ∈ A, we have
MinEval(τ,Bcost, C − A)−MinEval(τ,Bcost, C) > 0.
Let λ = minA⊆C
a∈A
[MinEval(τ,Bcost, C − A)−MinEval(τ,Bcost, C)]. Consider the vec-
tor π with πb = 0 for all b ∈ C−{a} and πa = λ and πµ = M−MinEval(τ,Bcost, C)−
λ. Since λ ≤ M−MinEval(τ,Bcost, C), this vector is feasible in the focus point price
linear program and achieves a objective function value greater than zero.
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Lemma 3.5.7. If it is possible to approximate the solution to the FPP problem on
input (C, τ, Bcost) within any multiplicative factor, then the NEL problem on input
(C, τ, Bcost) is solvable in polynomial time.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 3.5.6.
A set of (C, τ, Bcost) instances is proper if the following conditions hold:
• Given that (C, τ, Bcost) is in the set, then so is (C, τ̂ , Bcost), where τ̂(a) =
τ(a) + πa for a vector π ∈ <|C|+ .
• Given that (C, τ, Bcost) is in the set, then so is (A, τ̂ , Bcost∗), where the triple
(Ĉ, τ̂ , Bcost∗) is the full shadow extension of (C, τ, Bcost) and A is a subset of
Ĉ.
The definition of proper has a natural interpretation when applied to the
transformations of combinatorial minimization problems to buyer-supplier games.
For example, for the shortest path problem, the first condition implies that the set
of instances is closed with respect to lengthening the edges of the graph. On the
other hand, the second condition implies that the set of instances is closed with
respect to adding parallel edges or removing a subset of the edges.
Theorem 3.5.8. On a proper set of instances, the separation problem over Equa-
tions (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3), the NEL problem and the OPT-SET problem are poly-
nomial time equivalent.
Proof. If we can solve the NEL problem on a proper set of instances in polynomial
time, then, by Lemma 3.5.5, we can solve the OPT-SET problem in polynomial
time.
If we can solve the OPT-SET problem on a proper set of instances in poly-
nomial time, then, by Theorem 3.4.1, we can solve the separation problem over
Equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) in polynomial time.
If we can solve the separation problem over Equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3)
on a proper set of instances in polynomial time, then, by the polynomial time equiva-
lence of separation and optimization, we can optimize linear objective functions over
Equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) in polynomial time. If we can optimize linear ob-
jective functions in polynomial time, by Lemma 3.5.7 we can solve the NEL problem
in polynomial time.
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Lemma 3.5.9. On a proper set of instances, if it is not possible to solve the OPT-
SET problem in polynomial time, it is not possible to approximate the solution to
the FPP problem to within any multiplicative factor in polynomial time.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 3.5.8 and Lemma 3.5.7.
3.6 A Complementary Combinatorial Algorithm
In this section, we present an efficient combinatorial algorithm for solving the FPP
problem for the buyer-supplier minimum spanning tree (MST) game. Before we go
on to give the algorithm in Section 3.6.2, we present a useful simplification of the
linear program representing the FPP problem for general buyer-supplier games that
may be of independent interest.
3.6.1 A Simplification of the FPP Problem
In this section, we give a simplified linear program that may be used to solve the
FPP problem.
For this section, fix a buyer-supplier game defined by (C, τ, Bcost). Let
the buyer-supplier game be derived from the combinatorial minimization problem
MinProb as described in Section 3.1. We omit the parameters τ and Bcost from
MinEval since they are fixed by the game.
Lemma 3.6.1. For all A ⊆ C, we have MinEval(A) = min(M,MinProb(A)).










We explicitly instantiate the case when B = ∅. Since Bcost(∅) = M , we have







Since P (B) = 0 implies Bcost(B) = M and since τ(a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ C, we have
MinEval(A) = min(M, min
B ⊆ A






Consider the linear program from the FPP problem for the given game.
In particular, consider the variable πµ. The variable can be viewed as a slack
variable for the constraint arising from Equation (3.3). In specific, we can write
0 ≤ πµ = M−MinEval(C)−
∑
b∈C πb, where the inequality comes from the constraint
πµ ≥ 0 and the equality comes from the constraint arising from Equation (3.3).









πb ≤ MinEval(C − A)−MinEval(C) for all A ⊆ C∑
b∈C
πb ≤ M −MinEval(C)
πb ≥ 0 for all b ∈ C.








πb ≤ min(M,MinProb(C − A))−min(M,MinProb(C)) ∀A ⊆ C∑
b∈C
πb ≤ M −min(M,MinProb(C))
πb ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ C.
Call the above linear program LP1 and let its optimal value be O1.
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πb ≤ MinProb(C − A)−MinProb(C) for all A ⊆ C
πb ≥ 0 for all b ∈ C.
Call the above linear program LP2 and let its optimal value be O2.
Lemma 3.6.2. If MinProb(C) ≥ M , then O1 = 0.
Proof. Consider the inequality that must be satisfied by all vectors feasible in LP1,∑
b∈C πb ≤ min(M,MinProb(C − C))−min(M,MinProb(C)). The right hand side of
this inequality is equal to 0, since M ≤ MinProb(C) and MinProb(∅) = ∞. Thus,
we know that O1 ≤ 0. We also have O1 ≥ 0 since the all zero vector is feasible for
LP1.
Lemma 3.6.3. If MinProb(C) < M and O2 ≤ M −MinProb(C), then O1 = O2.
Proof. Since MinProb(C) < M , for any A ⊆ C we have
min(M,MinProb(C − A))−min(M,MinProb(C))
= min(M,MinProb(C − A))−MinProb(C)
≤ MinProb(C − A)−MinProb(C)
Thus, if a vector π is feasible in LP1, then π is also feasible in LP2. Thus, we have
O1 ≤ O2.
Let π∗ be an optimal vector for LP2. Let A be any subset of C. Since π∗ is
feasible in LP2, we have∑
b∈A
π∗b ≤ MinProb(C − A)−MinProb(C).









π∗b ≤ min(M,MinProb(C − A))−MinProb(C)
= min(M,MinProb(C − A))−min(M,MinProb(C))
Thus, π∗ is feasible in LP1. Thus, we have O1 ≥ O2.
Thus, O1 = O2.
Lemma 3.6.4. If MinProb(C) < M and O2 > M −MinProb(C), then O1 = M −
MinProb(C).
Proof. Let π∗ be an optimal vector for LP2. Thus, we have∑
a∈C
π∗a = O2 > M −MinProb(C)
Let ν∗ ∈ <|C| be any vector such that
0 ≤ ν∗a ≤ π∗a for all a ∈ C∑
a∈C
ν∗a = M −MinProb(C)
We know that such a ν∗ exists since we can decrease each of the coordinates of π∗




a = M −
MinProb(C).
Thus, ν∗ is feasible in the constraint
∑
a∈C ν
∗ ≤ M − min(M,MinProb(C))
of LP1.





ν∗a = M −MinProb(C).









ν∗a ≤ min(M,MinProb(C − A))−MinProb(C)
= min(M,MinProb(C − A))−min(M,MinProb(C))
and ν∗ is feasible in LP1.
The value of LP1 for vector ν∗ is M − MinProb(C). But, the constraint∑
a∈C ν ≤ M −min(M,MinProb(C)) of LP1, which must be satisfied by all feasible
vectors ν, tells us that the value of LP1 can be at most M −MinProb(C). Thus, we
have O1 = M −MinProb(C).
By Lemmas 3.6.2, 3.6.3, and 3.6.4, finding the value of MinProb(C) and the
solution to LP2 is sufficient to solve the FPP problem for given buyer-supplier game.
3.6.2 The Combinatorial Algorithm
Let a graph G = (V, E) and edge weights w : E → <+ be given. Let MSTVal :
2E → <+ be a function that takes as input a set of the edges A ⊆ E and returns the
weight of the minimum spanning tree of the graph induced by the edges of A. If no
spanning tree exists, MSTVal returns ∞.
By the transformation in Section 3.1 and Lemma 3.3.21 in the buyer-supplier
minimum spanning tree game, we have C = E , τ(a) = w(a), and Bcost(A) = M if
A does not connect all nodes in V, or 0 otherwise. We omit the parameters τ and
Bcost from MinEval, since they are fixed by the game.
We begin with some basics on MSTs.
Lemma 3.6.5. Let H = (V1, E1) be any graph. Let T = (V1, E ′1) be a minimum
spanning tree of the graph H. For e ∈ E ′1 let the cut created in T by the removal of
e be (Ae,Be) for some Ae ⊆ V1 and Be ⊆ V1.
• The edge e is a minimum weight edge spanning the cut (Ae,Be).
• The tree T restricted to vertices in Ae is a minimum spanning tree of the graph
induced by the vertices Ae. A symmetric statement is true for Be
• Let U be the set of edges spanning the cut and let a = arg minb∈U−{e}w(b).
We have w(a)− w(e) = MSTVal(E1 − {e})−MSTVal(E1).
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Proof. We use a proof by contradiction. Suppose there is some other edge e′ which
spans the cut such that w(e′) < w(e). Then, we could get a new spanning tree T ′
of the graph H by replacing the edge e in E ′1 with the edge e′. The tree T ′ has a
strictly smaller weight than the tree T since w(e′) < w(e), contradicting the fact
that T is a minimum spanning tree of H.
Similarly, if T restricted to the vertices in Ae is not a minimum spanning
tree of the graph induced by the vertices in Ae, we can construct a spanning tree of
H with weight strictly smaller than T by connecting e, the tree T restricted to Be,
the minimum spanning tree induced by the vertices in A.
By first second result of this lemma, a minimum spanning tree of the graph
induced by E1 − {e} can be obtained by keeping the portions of T which lie wholly
in exactly one of Ae or Be and attaching the smallest weight edge which spans the
cut. Thus, we get w(a)− w(e) = MSTVal(E1 − {e})−MSTVal(E1).
The following lemma is due to Bikhchandani et al., who show that in the
MST buyer-supplier game, the suppliers are substitutes [9].
Lemma 3.6.6. Suppose the graph G is connected and thus MSTVal(E) is finite. For




Let LP2 be as in Section 3.6.1 with MinProb equal to MSTVal.
Lemma 3.6.7. The inequalities corresponding to singleton sets {e} for e ∈ E form
an optimal basis for LP2. In particular, setting πe = MSTVal(E − {e})−MSTVal(E)
for all e ∈ E gives an optimal vector for LP2.






≤ MSTVal(E − A)−MSTVal(E).
Thus, π is feasible in LP2. Each inequality of type πe ≤ MSTVal(E − {e}) −
MSTVal(E) is tight, thus it is not possible to increase any coordinate of π. Thus π
is an optimal vector and the singleton inequalities form an optimal basis.
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We give a modified Kruskal Algorithm which can be used to compute the
optimal value of LP2.
Run Kruskal Algorithm with the following modifications.
• Throughout the algorithm’s execution we will keep an auxiliary set of edges,
A, which is initially empty.
• When edge e is added to the minimum spanning forest, also add e to the set
A.
• Suppose edge e is rejected from addition to the minimum spanning Forest
because it creates a cycle. Let the cycle created be H = (V ′, E ′). For each
edge a ∈ E ′ − {e}, if a ∈ A, label a with w(e)− w(a) and remove a from A.
Lemma 3.6.8. Let G be connected and T = (V1, E1) be the minimum spanning tree
computed by the modified Kruskal Algorithm when it is run on G = (V, E). If e ∈ E1
has been labeled, the label is equal to MSTVal(E − {e}) − MSTVal(E). Otherwise,
MSTVal(E − {e})−MSTVal(E) = ∞.
Proof. Let U be the set of edges spanning the cut created in T by the removal of e.
Also, let a′ be any arg minb∈U−{e}w(b). By Lemma 3.6.5 we have w(a′) − w(e) =
MSTVal(E − {e})−MSTVal(E).
Let e be labeled by the modified Kruskal Algorithm when the edge a creates
a cycle. For the first part of the lemma, all we must show is a = a′.
Let K be the set of edges which create a cycle involving e during the algo-
rithm. If b ∈ E − U , then b does not span the cut created in T by the removal of
e. Thus, both vertices of b lie on the same side of the cut. Thus, b cannot create a
cycle involving e, since all edges in the cycle except b must be in the tree T . Also,
the edge e cannot form a cycle with itself. Thus, we have K ⊆ U − {e}.
Consider any b ∈ U − {e}. The edge b must be rejected by the modified
Kruskal algorithm, otherwise the edge would be in T and wouldn’t span the cut
created in T by the removal of e. Thus, b must create a cycle during the algorithm.
Since all edges except b which make up the cycle must be in T and b spans the cut
created by e, the cycle created by b includes e. Thus, we have U − {e} ⊆ K, and
U − {e} = K.
Since the modified Kruskal Algorithm process edges of G in ascending order
of weight and e is labeled by the element from K which is processed first, we know
81
a = arg minb∈Kw(b). Since K = U , we also have a = a′ and we have shown the first
part of the lemma.
If e is not labeled, then K must be empty. Since K = U , the set U must also
be empty. And thus, the removal of e must disconnect the graph G. Thus we have,
MSTVal(E − {e})−MSTVal(E) = ∞.
By Lemmas 3.6.7 and 3.6.8, we can find the optimal value to LP2 using
the modified Kruskal algorithm. By Lemmas 3.6.2, 3.6.3, and 3.6.4, the minimum
spanning tree weight of G and the optimal value of LP2 give us the optimal value
of LP1 which is the focus point price of the buyer-supplier minimum spanning tree





Motivated by applications related to auctions, mechanism design, and revenue man-
agement, Babaioff et al. recently introduced a generalization of the secretary problem
called the online matroid problem [8]. In the online matroid problem, the goal is to
build a maximum weight independent set, but we are constrained from knowing the
full input to the problem. Instead, the matroid elements are revealed one at a time,
and we must immediately decide whether to include the revealed element in the
independent set. In such a setting, an online algorithm is said to be c-competitive
if it is able to produce an independent set with weight within a factor of c of the
weight of a maximum weight independent [11]. We say that an online algorithm is
competitive if it is c-competitive for some constant c.
Babaioff et al. present competitive algorithms for the online matroid prob-
lem on bounded left-degree transversal matroids and graphic matroids. They also
present a reduction showing that if we have a competitive algorithm for a matroid
M , then we can construct a competitive algorithm for a truncated version of M .
Babaioff et al. leave open the general online matroid problem and the central case
of transversal matroids. As discussed later in this section, the case of transversal
matroids unifies the existing results on the online matroid problem. In this chapter
we present a competitive online algorithm for weighted matching in transversal ma-
troids, generalizing the results of Babaioff et al. Along with the reduction in Babaioff
et al., our results also lead to competitive algorithms on truncated transversal ma-
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troids.
Informally, the online weighted transversal matroid matching problem can
be described as follows. Consider a bipartite graph, with a set of m left-vertices and
a set of n right-vertices. All edges adjacent to the same left-vertex have the same
weight – we associate this weight with the left-vertex. The weighted transversal
matroid matching problem (WTMM) asks us to find a maximum weight matching
in this bipartite graph, and is solvable with the standard matroid greedy algorithm.
In the online weighted transversal matroid matching problem (OWTMM), we are
initially given only the total number of left-vertices, and then a uniformly random
permutation of the left-vertices is revealed, one left-vertex at a time. When a vertex
is revealed, we learn of both its weight and its incident edges. Upon seeing a
particular left-vertex, without knowing the details of the remaining unrevealed left-
vertices, we must immediately decide which right-vertex to match it to, if any. An
open problem left by Babaioff et al. is to find an algorithm for OWTMM returning
a matching with expected weight within a constant of the optimal matching in the
corresponding WTMM problem. Theorem 4.7.1 presents such an algorithm.
In the literature, a transversal matroid is often specified by a set of elements
E, and a set of subsets A1, . . . , An of E [33]. A subset I = {a1, . . . , ak} of E is
considered independent if there is an injective function f mapping I to {A1, . . . , An}
such that x ∈ f(x) for all inputs x. In our presentation, the set of elements E
corresponds to the left-vertices, the sets A1, . . . , An correspond to the right-vertices,
and there is an edge between an element of E and a set Aj if the element belongs
to the set. An independent set then corresponds to a set of left-vertices for which
there exists a matching to the right-vertices.
Perhaps the most well studied online matroid problem is the secretary prob-
lem, which first appeared as a folklore problem in the 1950’s and has a long his-
tory [20, 21]. The problem was first solved by Lindley, who also presents a competi-
tive algorithm for the secretary problem [36]. Competitive algorithms also exist for
uniform matroids [32], bounded left-degree transversal matroids, graphic matroids,
and truncated matroids [8]. For general matroids, the best known competitive ratio
is O(log r) where r is the rank of the matroid [8].
With the exception of truncated matroids, where the result depends on
Karger’s matroid sampling theorem [30], all of the matroids for which a compet-
itive algorithm is known are a special case of the transversal matroid. For example,
84
the secretary problem is a transversal matroid with a single right-vertex. The uni-
form matroid of rank r is a transversal matroid on a complete bipartite graph with
r right-vertices. Of course, bounded left-degree transversal matroids are a special
case of the transversal matroids. And, finally, the competitive results for graphic
matroids follow from a reduction to bounded left-degree transversal matroids. Thus,
indeed, transversal matroids play a central role to the theory. For some remarks
on the strong connection between general matroids and transversal matroids, see
Section 4.8.
4.1.1 Algorithm Motivations
Recall that the secretary problem is OWTMM with a single right-vertex and consider
the following classic algorithm for the secretary problem. We sample the first m/2
left-vertices we see, rejecting all of them, but recording their edge weights. We set a
price for the right-vertex equal to the maximum weight edge we see in the sample.
We then match the right-vertex with the first non-sampled left-vertex whose edge
weight exceeds the price, if we see such a left-vertex. The algorithm is competitive
since with probability at least 1/4, the second heaviest edge is sampled and the
heaviest edge is not sampled.
This simple sample-and-price algorithm is the motivation for most of the
competitive algorithms known for online matroid problems, again with the exception
of truncated matroids. However, extending this algorithm to work for all, general
transversal matroids is not straightforward. For example, Babaioff et al. show that
a sample-and-price algorithm with an adaptive sampling time which sets the same
price for all the right-vertices does not work. Babaioff et al. also show that a
more complicated scheme, where the price required of a non-sampled left-vertex is
determined by a circuit of sampled left-vertices also does not work.
One of the main issues that arises in trying to generalize the sample-and-
price algorithm is a tension between the need to use sampled heavy left-vertices
to price the right-vertices and the requirement that we not over-price too many
right-vertices. Consider the example in Figure 4.1a. If in the sample we see the
left-vertex of weight 2, we should not over-price all the right-vertices at 2, since
that prevents us from matching a large number of vertices of weight 1. The figure
is only meant as an illustration, but can be extended to a counter-example for a
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(a) Example 1 (b) Example 2
Figure 4.1: Two example transversal matroids exhibiting the tension between us-
ing sampled heavy left-vertices for pricing and over-pricing the right-vertices. The
figures are meant only to be illustrative, but can be extended to become counter-
examples for certain pricing strategies. In 4.1a, we do not want to price all the
right-vertices at 2, since we would miss many left-vertices of weight 1. In 4.1b,
we want to price the bottom right-vertex at 2, since otherwise we would miss the
infinite weight left-vertex.
heavy pricing method by adding log m clones of the left-vertex of weight 2. On
the other hand, consider the example in Figure 4.1b. If we do not set a price of
2 for the bottom-most right-vertex, we would prematurely match that right-vertex
to a left-vertex of weight 1 instead of the infinite weight left-vertex. It is natural
to consider more complex pricing schemes, such as dynamic prices that change
throughout processing, or picking a random subset of the neighbors of a heavy left-
vertex and pricing only those neighbors. However, it is both unclear if such schemes
are effective and it is difficult to analyze them as they often introduce complicated
probabilistic dependencies. It is this tension that leads Babaioff et al. to consider
bounded left-degree transversal matroids.
For our results, we avoid the difficulties arising from more complex schemes
with the concept of “candidate edges.” The candidate edges we introduce have the
following important properties. First, each left-vertex i has at most one candidate
edges, uniquely determined by the sampled left-vertices heavier than i. In other
words, given the sampled left-vertices heavier than i, the candidate edge is the
same regardless of whether i is sampled, or where in the random order of non-
sampled vertices it appears. Second, the candidate edges of the sampled left-vertices
constitute a matching that is within a constant-factor of the max-weight matching
on the sampled subgraph.
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The analysis following from our definition of candidate edges is essentially
the original sample-and-price analysis from the secretary problem, but applied to
each right-vertex separately. The algorithm prices right-vertices using only the can-
didate edges. Furthermore, a non-sampled left-vertex can only be matched using
its candidate edge. For a particular right-vertex, as in the secretary problem, we
hope that the second-heaviest left-vertex with a candidate edge to the right-vertex
is sampled, but the heaviest left-vertex with a candidate edge to the right vertex
not sampled. Similarly to the secretary problem, this happens with at least 1/4
probability.
The overall argument structure is as follows. In Section 4.2, we define some
useful notation. In Section 4.3, we define candidate edges and show that they con-
stitute a matching with weight within a constant factor of optimal on the sampled
subgraph. In Section 4.4, to avoid any confusion from probabilistic dependencies,
we analyze sampled and non-sampled matchings through counting arguments. Our
counting argument immediately imply that a matching resulting from candidate
edges of non-sampled left-vertices has expected weight within a constant factor of
the expected weight of the matching of candidate edges of sampled left-vertices. In
Section 4.5, we show that the expected weight of the sampled candidate edge match-
ing is within a constant factor of the max-weight matching on the entire graph. This
completes the main technical arguments, since the non-sampled matching is within
a constant factor of the sampled matching, which is within a constant of the opti-
mal matching on the whole graph. In Section 4.6, we present a small but clarifying
intermediate algorithm between the final online algorithm and the counting argu-
ments presented earlier. Finally, in Section 4.7, we present the online algorithm and
conclude the analysis.
4.2 Definitions
In this section, we formally define some quantities and notation we will use through-
out the chapter.
Fix a set of n right-vertices, numbered 0 to n− 1.
Fix a set of m left-vertices, where each left-vertex i is described by a triple
of 1) a real number weight, w(i) 2) a unique integer ID and 3) a subset of the right
vertices, Right(i). We define a total order on the left-vertices: we say a left-vertex i
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is less than a left-vertex i′ if w(i) > w(i′) or w(i) = w(i′) and i has a smaller unique
integer ID. We draw the reader’s attention to the fact that smaller left-vertices have
greater weight. From here on, we use the integers to denote the left-vertices, with
0 denoting the minimum left-vertex, 1 denoting the second minimum left-vertex
and so forth. We draw the reader’s attention to the fact that the ordering on the
left-vertices is the same as the ordering on the corresponding integers.
For a nonempty subset A of left-vertices or right-vertices let Min(A) return
the minimum vertex, as defined by the corresponding total order.
An edge is a pair (i, j), where i is a left-vertex and j belongs to Right(i). A
matching is a set of edges M such that each vertex appears in at most one edge.
For a matching M , let Left(M), Right(M), denote the left-vertices, right-vertices,
in the matching, respectively.
For a set of left-vertices, A, we say w(A) =
∑
i∈A w(i). For a matching M ,
we say w(M) = w(Left(M)).
To facilitate our proofs, we define the following notation. For a subset of
left-vertices L, let Prefix(L, i) = {i′ ∈ L | i′ < i}. Similarly, for a matching M , let
Prefix(M, i) = {(i′, j) ∈ M | i′ < i}.
4.3 Algorithm A
In this section we define candidate edges and show the two main properties discussed
in Section 4.1.1. The first property, “each left-vertex i has exactly zero or one
candidate edges, uniquely determined by the sampled left-vertices heavier than i”
corresponds to Lemmas 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. The second property, “the candidate edges
of the sampled left-vertices constitute a matching that is within a constant-factor of
the max-weight matching on the sampled subgraph” corresponds to Lemma 4.3.5.
First, we define a function Cands(i,M) that receives a left-vertex i and a
matching M , and returns an edge set. The Cands(i,M) function is as follows:
M ′ := Prefix(M, i)
A := Right(i)− Right(M ′)





Lemma 4.3.1. For any left-vertex i and matching M , Cands(i,M) either returns
the empty set, or {(i, j)}, where j is a right-vertex unmatched in Prefix(M, i).
Proof. Follows from the definition of Cands.
Lemma 4.3.2. For any left-vertex i and matchings M and M ′ with Prefix(M, i) =
Prefix(M ′, i), we have Cands(i,M) = Cands(i,M ′).
Proof. Follows from the definition of Cands.
We now define an algorithm for WTMM. Algorithm AlgA(L) takes a subset
of left-vertices L and returns a matching and the algorithm is performed as follows:
M := ∅
for i in increasing order in L
M := M ∪ Cands(i,M)
return M
Recall that the total order on left-vertices is defined such that i is less than i′ if
w(i) > w(i′) or w(i) = w(i′) and i has a smaller unique integer ID.
Lemma 4.3.3. For a subset of left-vertices L, let M̃ = AlgA(L), then M̃ is a
matching on L and M̃ = ∪k∈LCands(k, M̃).
Proof. We prove the lemma by first proving the following loop invariant in AlgA(L):
M is a matching on Prefix(L, i) and M = ∪k∈Prefix(L,i)Cands(k, M).
The claimed invariant hold initially since M := ∅ and i = Min(L). Suppose
the claim is true for M and i on entering the loop on which we process i. Let
M ′ = M ∪ Cands(i,M) and i′ be the next left-vertex in order from L. We must
show the claim holds for M ′ and i′.
Let A = Cands(i,M). We split the analysis in two cases. First, suppose
A = ∅. Then, M ′ = M and the claim holds for M ′ and i′ simply because it holds
for M and i.
Second, suppose A = {(i, j)}, for a right-vertex j unmatched in Prefix(M, i)
(Lemma 4.3.1). Since Prefix(L, i′) = Prefix(L, i)∪{i}, the first part of the invariant
holds.
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For the second part of the invariant, we have













The second equality holds because the loop invariant holds for M and i, the third
equality holds by the definition of i′, and the final equality holds by Lemma 4.3.2.
This proves the invariant.
The lemma statement follows from following the same reasoning as in the
inductive step above, but taken for the final iteration of the loop.
Lemma 4.3.4. Let M∗ be a max-weight matching on L and M be the matching
returned by AlgA(L). If (i, j) ∈ M∗ and i is unmatched in M , then there is a i′
such that (i′, j) ∈ M and w(i′) ≥ w(i).
Proof. By Lemma 4.3.3, M = ∪k∈LCands(k, M). Since i is not matched in M and
by Lemma 4.3.1, we have ∅ = Cands(i,M). By the definition of Cands, the empty
set can only be returned if Right(i) ⊆ Right(Prefix(M, i)). In other words, every
right-vertex in Right(i) is matched to a left-vertex less than i in M , completing the
proof.
Lemma 4.3.5. Let M∗ be a max-weight matching on L, and M be the matching
returned by AlgA(L). Then w(M) ≥ 12w(M
∗).
Proof. By summing the inequality in Lemma 4.3.4 over left-vertices matched in
M∗ − M , we have w(M) ≥ w(M∗ − M). By definition of intersection, we have
w(M) ≥ w(M∗∩M). Combining the two inequalities, we have 2w(M) ≥ w(M∗).
4.4 Counting Arguments
In this section, to avoid confusion with probabilistic dependencies, we analyze sam-
pled and non-sampled matchings through counting arguments. As stated in Section
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4.1.1, our counting arguments, in specific Lemma 4.4.9, immediately imply that a
matching resulting from candidate edges of non-sampled left-vertices has expected
weight at least 1/4 of the expected weight of the matching of candidate edges of
sampled left-vertices. From this section we only export Lemma 4.4.1, which is used
to connect the counting arguments with the final online algorithm, and Lemma
4.4.9.
Let α be a binary string and αi be the i’th character in the string. Intuitively,
the reader should think of a 0 in the i’th position of α as sampling the left-vertex i
and of a 1 in the i’th position as not sampling i. For two binary strings α and β,
let αβ denote concatenation. For a binary string α of length at most m, we define
the sets of edges M0(α),M2(α), E0(α) recursively as follows.
M0(ε) = E0(ε) = ∅
M2(α) = Cands(|α|,M0(α))
M0(α0) = M0(α) ∪M2(α)
M0(α1) = M0(α)
E0(α0) = E0(α)
E0(α1) = E0(α) ∪M2(α)
Finally, we also define E1(α) = M0(α) ∪ E0(α) and M1(α) to be {(i, j) ∈ E0(α) | j
appears at most once in E0(α)}. It is not difficult to show that M0(α), M1(α) and
M2(α) are matchings while E0(α) and E1(α) are sets of edges.
We give the reader a loose intuitive interpretation of these definitions. Intu-
itively, one can think of processing the left-vertices in order of increasing weight as we
increase the length of α. Then, M2(α) represents the |α|’th candidate edge; M0(α)
represents a matching created from the sampled left-vertices; E0(α) represents a
set of edges created from the non-sampled left-vertices such that each non-sampled
left-vertex appears at most once; E1(α) represents a set of all candidate edges, re-
gardless of whether the corresponding left-vertex is sampled; and M1(α) represents
a matching created from the non-sampled left-vertices.
Lemma 4.4.1. For a binary string α of length at most m, let A = {i | αi = 0}
and B = {i | αi = 1}. We have, M0(α) =
⋃




Proof. We prove the claim by induction on the length of α. For α = ε, the claim
follows from the definition of M0(ε) and E0(ε). The inductive claim follows from
Lemma 4.3.2 and the recursive definitions of M0(α) and E0(α).
For a set of edges A, let deg(A, j) denote the degree of the right-vertex j in
A. For a left-vertex i and a right-vertex j, we partition the set of binary strings to
assist in our counting arguments as follows.
α ∈ S0(i, j) if |α| < i, deg(E1(α), j) = 0
α ∈ S1(i, j) if |α| = i,deg(E1(α), j) = 0,M2(α) = {(i, j)}
α ∈ S2(i, j) if deg(E0(α), j) = deg(E1(α), j) = 1, α = βγ, β ∈ S1(i, j)
α ∈ S3(i, j) if deg(E0(α), j) = 1,deg(E1(α), j) > 1, α = βγ, β ∈ S2(i, j)
α ∈ S4(i, j) otherwise.
We give the reader some intuitive interpretation of the above sets. For a
particular pair (i, j): S0(i, j) represents strings where j has never been returned
by Cands and we have not yet reached i; S1(i, j) represents strings where Cands
has never before returned j, we have just now reached i and Cands returns {(i, j)};
S2(i, j) represents strings where j has been returned exactly once by Cands, when j
was returned by Cands it was along with i and i was non-sampled; S3(i, j) represents
strings where the first time Cands returned j it was along with i and i was non-
sampled, then j was returned again with some other, sampled vertex i′; finally,
S4(i, j) represents all other strings.
Lemma 4.4.2.
α ∈ S1(i, j) ⇒ α0 ∈ S4(i, j), α1 ∈ S2(i, j)
α ∈ S2(i, j),∃i′M2(α) = {(i′, j)} ⇒ α0 ∈ S3(i, j), α1 ∈ S4(i, j)
α ∈ S2(i, j),∀i′M2(α) 6= {(i′, j)} ⇒ α0, α1 ∈ S2(i, j)
α ∈ S3(i, j) ⇒ α0, α1 ∈ S3(i, j)
α ∈ S4(i, j) ⇒ α0, α1 ∈ S4(i, j)
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Proof. The statement follows straightforwardly by case analysis from the recur-
sive definitions of M0(α), E0(α), E1(α) and the partition S0(i, j), S1(i, j), S2(i, j),
S3(i, j), S4(i, j). We provide some intuitive discussion.
For the first implication, appending 0 to α places {(i, j)} in M0, which places
α0 in S4. On the other hand, appending 1 to α places {(i, j)} in E0, which places
α1 in S2.
For the second implication, appending 0 to α places {(i′, j)} in M0, which
places α0 in S3. On the other hand, appending appending 1 to α places {(i′, j)} in
E0, which places α1 in S4.
For the third implication, neither appending 0 nor 1 to α increases the degree
of j in E1, so both extensions of α are in S2.
For the fourth implication, since α is in S3, we know that j is in M0. This
means that j can no longer be returned by Cands (Lemma 4.3.1). Thus regardless
of the appended character, the extension of α is in S3.
For the fifth implication, since appending a character to α does not decrease
the length of the string or decrease the degree of j in E0 or E1, both extensions of
α are in S4.
Lemma 4.4.3. For any right-vertex j, left-vertex i and integer k such that i < k ≤
m, we have
|S2(i, j) ∩ {0, 1}k|+ 2|S3(i, j) ∩ {0, 1}k| = 2k−i−1|S1(i, j)|.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on k with a base case k = i + 1.
For the base case, we have |S2(i, j) ∩ {0, 1}i+1| ≥ |S1(i, j)| since for every
α ∈ S1(i, j) we have that |α| = i by the definition of S1(i, j) and by Lemma 4.4.2 we
have α1 ∈ S2(i, j). By the definition of S2(i, j), all strings in S2(i, j) have length at
least i + 1. Also by the definition of S2(i, j), all strings of length i + 1 in S2(i, j) are
equal to α1 for some string in S1(i, j). Thus, we have |S2(i, j)∩{0, 1}i+1| ≤ |S1(i, j)|.
By the definition of S3(i, j), all strings in S3(i, j) have length at least i + 2. Thus,
|S3(i, j) ∩ {0, 1}i+1| = 0, completing the base case.
To show the inductive step, notice that the right-hand side of the claimed
equality exactly doubles as we increase k by one. We must show that the left-hand
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side of the equality also exactly doubles. By Lemma 4.4.2, for every α ∈ S2(i, j),
either α0 ∈ S3(i, j) or both α0, α1 ∈ S2(i, j). In either case, the count from the first
summand of the left-hand side of the equality doubles when we increase k by one.
Again, by Lemma 4.4.2, for every α ∈ S3(i, j), we have α0, α1 ∈ S3(i, j). So, the
count from the second summand of the left-hand side of the equality also doubles.
So the left-hand side at least doubles when we increase k by one.
By Lemma 4.4.2, the only ways for a string extended by one character to be
in S2(i, j) or S3(i, j) is by extending a string in S1(i, j), S2(i, j) or S3(i, j). In the
previous paragraph, we accounted for extensions from strings in S2(i, j) or S3(i, j).
All strings in S1(i, j) have length i, but in the inductive case k > i + 1. Thus, the
left-hand side of the claimed equality exactly doubles.
Lemma 4.4.4. For any right-vertex j, left-vertex i and integer k such that i < k ≤
m, we have
|(S2(i, j) ∪ S3(i, j)) ∩ {0, 1}k| ≥ 2k−i−2|S1(i, j)|.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4.3, we have that |S2(i, j) ∩ {0, 1}k| + 2|S3(i, j) ∩ {0, 1}k| =
2k−i−1|S1(i, j)|. We can increase the left-hand side to get 2|S2(i, j) ∩ {0, 1}k| +
2|S3(i, j) ∩ {0, 1}k| ≥ 2k−i−1|S1(i, j)|. Since S2(i, j) and S3(i, j) are disjoint, we
have |(S2(i, j) ∪ S3(i, j)) ∩ {0, 1}k| ≥ 2k−i−2|S1(i, j)|.






where w(M1(α), j) denotes the weight of the left-vertex matched to j in M1(α) or
zero if j is unmatched.
Proof. By the definitions of M1, S2 and S3, we have that (i, j) ∈ M1(α) if and only
if α ∈ (S2(i, j) ∪ S3(i, j)). Furthermore, by the definition of M1, if α has length
k, then only left-vertices less than k can be matched in M1. The left-hand side of
the claimed inequality is thus equal to
∑
0≤i<k w(i)|(S2(i, j) ∪ S3(i, j)) ∩ {0, 1}k|.
Applying Lemma 4.4.4 gives the desired result.
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Proof. Follows from summing the result of Lemma 4.4.5 over all 0 ≤ j < n.






where w(M0(α), j) is equal to the weight of the left-vertex matched to j in M0(α) or
zero if j is unmatched.
Proof. To prove this lemma, we first introduce some helpful claims and definitions.
For any binary string α of length at most k define f(α) as the set of proper prefixes
β of α such that M2(β) = {(|β|, j)}. The following two claims follow directly from
the definitions.
Claim 1: For any binary string α of length at most k, we have deg(E1(α), j) =
|f(α)|.
Claim 2: For any binary string α of length at most k, we have |f(α)| = 0
implies w(M0(α), j) = 0.
Let A denote all α ∈ {0, 1}k such that f(α) 6= ∅. For all α ∈ A let g(α)
denote the shortest string in f(α).
Claim 3: For any α in A, we have f(g(α)) = ∅. Since any proper prefix of
g(α) is also a proper prefix of α.
Claim 4: For any α in A, we have deg(E1(g(α)), j) = 0 and M2(g(α)) =
{(|g(α)|, j)}. Follows from Claims 1 and 3.
Claim 5: For any α in A, we have 0 ≤ |g(α)| < k and g(α) ∈ S1(|g(α)|, j).
Follows from Claim 4, the definition of S1 and since g(α) ∈ f(α).
Claim 6: For any α in A, we have w(M0(α), j) ≤ w(|g(α)|). Since M0(α) is
a matching, deg(M0(α), j) is either zero or one. If it is zero, the claim is trivial. If
it is one, then M0(α) contains a unique (i, j) for some left-vertex i. Thus, M2(β) =
{(i, j)} for some proper prefix β of α of length i. By the definition of g, |g(α)| ≤
|β| = i. So, the claim follows.
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Claim 7: For all 0 ≤ i < k and β in S1(i, j) we have |g−1(β)| ≤ 2k−i. Since
β ∈ S1(i, j) , we have |β| = i. Since g(α) is a prefix of α, |g−1(β)| is at most the
number of k bit extensions of β, which is 2k−i.








































where the first step follows from Claim 2 and the definition of A; the second step
follows from Claim 5; step three follows from Claim 6; step four follows since α ∈
g−1(β) and β ∈ S1(i, j) implies i = |β| = |g(α)|; step five follows from Claim 7; and
step 6 is immediate.








Proof. Follows from summing the result of Lemma 4.4.7 over all 0 ≤ j < n.









Proof. Follows from Lemmas 4.4.8 and 4.4.6.
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4.5 Analysis Under a Probability Distribution
In this section we begin working with probability distributions and show that the
expected weight of the sampled candidate edge matching is within a constant factor
of the max-weight matching on the entire graph (Lemma 4.5.2). We tie these results
with Section 4.4, to show that the expected weight of the non-sampled matching is
within a constant the weight of a max-weight matching on the entire graph (Lemma
4.5.4), completing the main technical portion of the argument. The only result
exported from this section is Lemma 4.5.4.
Define a function Sample, which takes an m-bit binary string string α such
that Sample(α) = {i | αi = 0}. We introduce a probability distribution P on m-bit
binary strings α. In P, each αi independently has an equal chance of αi = 0 and
αi = 1.
Lemma 4.5.1. Let M∗ be a max-weight matching and Mα denote a max-weight
matching on the subgraph induced by Sample(α) for a binary string α. Then,
Exp[w(Mα)] ≥ 12w(M
∗).
Proof. We have Exp[w(Mα)] ≥
∑




first step follows from the linearity of expectation and observing that the matching
Mα as a weight at least as big as the weight of a matching M ′α = {(i, j) ∈ M∗ | αi =
0}.













where the first step follows from Lemma 4.3.5 and the second step follows from
Lemma 4.5.1 and the linearity of expectation.
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Lemma 4.5.3. Let α be any m-bit binary string and A = Sample(α). We have
M0(α) = AlgA(A).
Proof. Follows from the definition of AlgA and M0.
















where the first inequality follows from Lemma 4.4.9, the equality follows from
Lemma 4.5.3, and the final inequality follows from Lemma 4.5.2.
4.6 Intermediate Algorithm
In this section we analyze a useful intermediate algorithm between the counting
arguments and the final online algorithm. In specific, in the counting argument, we
process the non-sampled left-vertices in decreasing order of weight. In this section
we use Lemma 4.4.1 to argue that we can process the non-sampled left-vertices in
an arbitrary order. This is similar to what happens in the original sample-and-price
algorithm in the secretary problem. In the secretary problem, we depend on the
fraction of time when the second highest bidder is sampled and the highest bidder
is not. When this happens, we can process the non-sampled bidders in an arbitrary
order, since only one of them meets the required price.
We define an algorithm AlgB(α) that takes an m-bit binary string α, and
returns a matching. The AlgB(α) function is as follows:
M := AlgA(Sample(α))
A := {0, . . . ,m} − Sample(α)
E := ∅
for i in arbitrary order from A:
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E := E ∪ Cands(i,M)
return the matching of pairs (i, j) in E where j appears at
most once in E.
Lemma 4.6.1. For any m-bit binary string α, we have AlgB(α) = M1(α).
Proof. The results of Lemma 4.5.3 give that for any m-bit binary string α we have
M0(α) = AlgA(Sample(α)). Applying Lemma 4.4.1, we also have that E0(α) =⋃
i∈A Cands(i,M0(α)), where A is as in AlgB. Thus, at the end of the loop in AlgB,
E is equal to E0(α). The lemma statement follows from the definition of M1(α) and
the last line of AlgB.
4.7 Online Algorithm
In this section, we define and analyze the final online algorithm, which is closely
related to the algorithm in Section 4.6. The main difference between the two algo-
rithms is that the online algorithm must rely on the random permutation of left-
vertices for sampling whereas up to now we have discussed a simpler direct sampling
method, where each element has an equal chance of being sampled or not. With
Lemma 4.7.2 we show that the direct sampling method and the method of sampling
from the random permutation induce the same distribution. The main theorem
follows immediately from our previous results.
Define the online algorithm as follows. Initially, we are given the set of
right-vertices, and the total number of left-vertices we will see, m. The algorithm
ONLINE proceeds in two phases.
First phase:
k := Bin(m, 12), where Bin is the binomial distribution.
Reject the first k vertices, not matching them to anything.
Let B be the set of all the rejected vertices.
M0 := AlgA(B).
Second phase:
We are given M0 from the first phase.
We build a matching M1, initialized to ∅.
On receiving a left-vertex i:
A := Cands(i,M0)
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if A 6= ∅ and the right-vertex in A is unmatched in M1
M1 := M1 ∪A
return the matching M1
Lemma 4.7.1. Let α be a m-bit binary string, B = Sample(α) and MB1 be a match-
ing returned by ONLINE when B is sampled in the first phase. Then, w(MB1 ) ≥
w(AlgB(α)).
Proof. ONLINE and AlgB perform the same operations on the vertices that are not
sampled, with the small optimization that ONLINE matches a right vertex j to the
first left-vertex i such that {(i, j)} = Cands(i,M0), while AlgB does not match any
right-vertex j that is returned twice by Cands.
Lemma 4.7.2. Consider a set A of m elements. Let P be the probability distribution
where each a ∈ A independently has an equal chance of being sampled or not sampled.
Let P ′ be the probability distribution where we first pick a k from Bin(m, 12).
Then, from a uniformly random permutation of A, we only sample the first k ele-
ments.
The probability distributions P and P ′ are equal.
Lemma 4.7.2. We simply prove that each particular sample set B ⊆ A appears
with the same probability in both distributions. The probability of any particular
sample B under P is 12m . We must show the same is true under P
′. Let |B| = k′. The












, where the first term comes
from the probability that the elements in B come first in the random permutation,
and the second term comes from the probability that k′ is chosen as the cutoff for
the sampling.
Theorem 4.7.1. Let M∗ be a max-weight matching. Given a uniformly random




Proof. Let P and P ′ be as defined in Lemma 4.7.2. We must show that the expected
weight of the matching produced by ONLINE under P ′ is at least 116w(M
∗).
By Lemma 4.7.1, for each possible sample selection ONLINE returns a match-
ing with weight at least as large as the matching returned by AlgB on the same
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sample. Thus, the expectation of ONLINE under P ′ is at least as large as the ex-
pectation of AlgB under P ′. Lemma 4.7.2, gives us the result that the expectation
of AlgB(α) when α is drawn from P ′ is the same as that when α is drawn from
P. Lemma 4.6.1 gives us the result that the expectation of AlgB(α) under P is the
same as the expectation of M1(α) under P. Finally, Lemma 4.5.4 shows that the
expectation of M1(α) under P is at least 116w(M
∗), completing the result.
4.8 Concluding Remarks
In this section we make some remarks on the strong connection between transversal
matroids and general matroids. The connection comes from the following charac-
terization of a basis: B is a basis of a matroid M iff B is a minimal set having
non-empty intersection with every co-circuit of M [43]. With this characterization,
one can think of a general matroid as a bipartite graph in the following way. Let
the matroid elements be the left-vertices and co-circuits be the right-vertices. Let
there be an edge between an element and a co-circuit if the element belongs to the
co-circuit. An independent set in the general matroid is then a combinatorial struc-
ture which is close to a matching, but not the same. Consider taking a particular
element into an independent set we are constructing. On taking in the element,
we cover all the co-circuits containing that element because they have non-empty
intersection with the constructed independent set. After that, to increase the inde-
pendent set, we can only take elements which cover some uncovered co-circuits. So,
in a sense, independent sets match left-vertices to subsets of right-vertices. Perhaps
it is possible to come up with a sample-and-price scheme for pricing co-circuits to




Summary and Future Directions
5.1 Summary
In this document, we present our contributions to three main algorithmic concerns
arising from large-scale distributed computing: dynamic membership, selfishness,
and incomplete information.
To address the concern of dynamic membership, in Chapter 2, we address
load balancing in distributed hash tables by analyzing variants of a related graph-
based coupon collector process. Using the scaffold of a delay sequence argument, we
show that several variants of the graph-based coupon collector lead to linear cover
times, both in expectation and with high probability. These results directly imply
load balance guarantees in distributed hash tables. We also show super-linear lower
bounds for the cover times of several variants, showing that slight differences in the
process specification affect the cover time results.
To address the concern of selfishness, in Chapter 3, we study optimization
over the core of buyer-supplier games. After describing a method to obtain buyer-
supplier games from combinatorial minimization problems, we show that the trans-
ferable utility core and non-transferable utility core of buyer-supplier games have
the same characterization. Using that characterization, we show both positive and
negative results on optimization over the core. We show that optimizing over the
core of a buyer-supplier game is polynomial time equivalent to solving the underlying
combinatorial minimization problem.
To address the concern of incomplete information, in Chapter 4, we present
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our results on the online matroid problem. Specifically, we show a competitive
algorithm for solving the online weighted transversal matroid matching problem.
Our results generalize several previous results on the online matroid problem and
are based on a novel sample-and-price algorithm. When combined with a previously
known reduction, our results also give competitive algorithms for the truncations of
transversal matroids.
5.2 Future Directions
In this section we briefly list several other problems of interest related to dynamic
membership, selfishness, and incomplete information.
Can we show load-balance results for joining and leaving a DHT?
In Chapter 2, we analyzed a random process related to load balance in a distributed
hash table. As discussed in Chapter 1, an O(n) cover time can be used to show
that, under the described DHT join procedure, if the DHT initially has a single
machine with a load of 1, then after n − 1 machines join the DHT, the load of
every machine is O( 1n) with high probability. However, our analysis does not extend
to machines dynamically joining and leaving the distributed hash table. Can we
show load-balance guarantees after a sequence of n arbitrarily ordered join/leave
operations?
Can we find a combinatorial algorithm for the FPP problem on the
buyer-supplier shortest path game? In Chapter 3, we presented a combinatorial
algorithm for the FPP problem on the buyer-supplier MST game. But, as discussed
in that chapter, in the buyer-supplier MST game, suppliers are substitutes. This
property makes the FPP problem particularly easy, as it can be expressed by a
polynomially sized linear program. In the buyer-supplier shortest path game, on
the other hand, suppliers are not substitutes. Currently, even though the shortest
path problem itself can be solved by a simple greedy algorithm, the only known
method of solving the FPP problem on the buyer-supplier shortest path game is the
ellipsoid method.
Can we find algorithms to compute the focus point price in games
other than buyer-supplier games? In Chapter 3, we presented our results on
computing the focus point price in buyer-supplier games with respect to the core
solution concept. The focus point price concept is widely applicable and easily
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Figure 5.1: An example showing that the algorithm for the online transversal ma-
troid problem presented in Chapter 4 does not produce a truthful mechanism. Sup-
pose that the left-vertices with bids 10 and 1 are sampled and used to price the
corresponding right-vertices. If the left-vertex, labeled ?, has a true weight of 11, it
has incentive to be untruthful. Reporting 11 would result in being matched to the
top right-vertex and a utility of 1, while reporting 2, would result in being matched
to the bottom right-vertex and a utility of 10.
extends to scenarios other than the core of buyer-supplier games. The focus point
price concept can be applied to any combination of a solution concept and a game.
We are interested to see if we can find bounds on the focus point price, or algorithms
to compute the focus point price in a wide class of games other than the buyer-
supplier games which we have already studied.
When do repeated auctions lead to core solutions? There have al-
ready been investigations into the relationship between the core and auctions. For
example, Bikhchandani and Ostoy show that under certain conditions, the outcome
of a VCG auction is in the core of a corresponding game between the buyers and
the auctioneer [10]. As we suggested in Chapter 1, the core solution concept was
developed with the notion that players communicate freely in advance of playing
the game. We are interested in whether repeatedly executing an auction, where
each execution is done without communication, leads to core solutions. The idea
behind this investigation is that the history of previous games serves as sufficient
communication to lead to a core outcome. Indeed, investigations on the connections
between competitive equilibria, such as Nash equilibria, and cooperative equilibria,
such as the core, exist. However, many of the existing results deal with convergence
as the number of players goes to infinity, or are limited to repeating a specific game
between a small number of players [38, 57, 61].
Is there an algorithm for online weighted transversal matroid match-
ing that produces a truthful mechanism? Several of the previous results on the
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online matroid problem produce truthful auctions [8, 32]. Our algorithm, perhaps
due to its more complex nature, does not produce a truthful auction. To illustrate
this point, consider Figure 5.1. Suppose that the left-vertices with bids 10 and 1 are
sampled and used to price the corresponding right-vertices. Furthermore, suppose
that the left-vertex labeled ? has a true weight of 11. This third left-vertex has
incentive to not be truthful, since reporting 11 would result in being matched to the
top right-vertex and a utility of 1. On the other hand, reporting 2, would result in
being matched to the bottom right-vertex and a utility of 10. This motivates our
interest in an algorithm for the online transversal matroid matching problem that
produces a truthful mechanism.
Can we solve the online matroid problem? In Chapter 4, we present
an algorithm for solving the online weighted transversal matroid matching problem.
At the end of the chapter, we discuss the connections between transversal matroids
and general matroids. We are interested in resolving the general case of the online
matroid problem. We do not have strong evidence or beliefs on whether there exists
an algorithm for the general case. Either an algorithm, or a lower-bound result
would be an interesting resolution to the online matroid problem.
Large-scale distributed computing has a rich algorithmic landscape with
many unexplored problems. It is certain that the algorithmic concerns of dynamic
membership, selfishness, and incomplete information will increase in prominence as
future systems include interactions between larger numbers of individuals.
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